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THE UNEXPECTED COSTS OF MORAL MINIMIZATION
AS AN INTERROGATION TACTIC
Margareth Etienne* & Richard McAdams**

INTRODUCTION
Consider an infrequently discussed tactic of American police
interrogation. Two examples come from the most popular training manual;
the third is a description from a journalist who spent a year following a
city’s homicide unit:
Egads, man, how in the world can anybody with a family the
size of yours get along on that kind of money in this day and
age? . . . Anyone else confronted with a similar situation
probably would have done the same thing, Joe. Your
company is at fault. . . . I can tell you this—if you received a
decent salary in the first place, you wouldn’t be here.1
Joe, this girl was having a lot of fun for herself by letting you
kiss her and feel her breasts. For her, that would have been
sufficient. But men aren’t built the same way. There’s a limit
to the teasing and excitement they can take; then something’s
got to give. A female ought to recognize this, and if she’s not
willing to go all the way, she ought to stop way short of what
this gal allowed you to do.2

*
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FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 223 (5th ed. 2013) (proposing the script for an employee theft interrogation).
2
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Beat your child to death and a police detective will wrap his
arm around you in the interrogation room, telling you about
how he beats his own children all the time, how it wasn’t
your fault if the kid up and died on you.3
These examples employ victim-blaming, which is an explicit part of
the common interrogation tactic of moral minimization. Minimization
involves efforts to persuade suspects that the consequences of confessing
are less than they suppose. Moral minimization involves the interrogating
detective endorsing moral excuses and justifications for the crime,
attempting to convince the suspect that even the police do not regard the
suspected criminal conduct to be seriously wrong.
These officially endorsed rationalizations for criminality are
powerful because they are surprising – coming from law enforcement
officials the suspect expects to strongly disapprove of felonies – and are
delivered persistently and sympathetically in the intimate setting of an
interrogation room. Police minimize the crime with a variety of techniques:
diminishing the harm the suspect caused the victim, emphasizing how
common the crime is, and shifting the blame to society, the victim, or
others. In the first excerpt, interrogators tell an embezzlement suspect that
“anyone” in the same situation would have stolen from their miserly
employer. In the second, detectives employ sexist tropes to blame the rape
victim for the rape. Interrogators described in the third passage confide
(falsely, one assumes) to having committed child abuse, which would be the
only crime the suspect had committed but for the bad luck of an
unexpectedly fragile victim, whose death makes the crime homicide.
The official theory for how moral minimization works – posited in
the interrogation manuals that recommend the tactic – is that it lowers the
psychological costs of confession.4 By making the crime seem less
shameful, the guilty suspect will feel less shame in admitting guilt to the
detectives. Although this expected effect of moral minimization is not
empirically validated, we believe that it is plausible. We argue, however,
3
4

DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 212 (1991).
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203-04.
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that there are two unexpected and harmful consequences that are at least as
plausible.5 First, if moral minimization lowers the internal, psychological
costs of confessing to crimes, it also lowers the internal, psychological costs
of committing future crimes. The tactic therefore risks promoting
recidivism. Second, the training and practice of victim-blaming (one type of
moral minimization) adversely affects policing and policing culture. The
sexist stereotypes used to blame women, for example, reinforce hypermasculine police culture, which impedes the investigation of domestic and
sexual assaults of women.
Regarding the first point, the interrogation manual recommending
the tactic of moral minimization explains its effectiveness by using a
psychological idea – neutralization theory – that holds that people are more
likely to offend if they can first neutralize the shame and guilt they would
ordinarily experience from committing a crime.6 In other words, many
offenders have internalized the social norms against violent and fraudulent
behavior that the criminal law enforces, but will still offend if they can
mentally diminish the norm’s psychological power with some superficially
plausible moral justification or excuse, or by trivializing the victim’s injury.
The aim of moral minimization is to reinforce this process of deflecting
guilt and shame. Ironically, then, the same theory that explains why moral
minimization will disinhibit an individual’s confession of crime predicts
that minimization will disinhibit the individual’s subsequent commission of
crime. Moral minimization tactics are likely to be criminogenic.
Alongside neutralization, four distinct criminal law theories buttress
our criminogenic claim. The first is restorative justice, a cross-cultural
reform movement that advocates the need for reconciliation of the offender
and victim.7 Through a confrontational process that is nearly the precise
opposite of moral minimization, and which lasts about the same time as a
police interrogation, restorative justice conferences reduce recidivism over a
period of years, according to the most rigorous empirical studies. A
standard explanation for that success is that the conferences challenge and
5
There is a legal and psychological literature discussing whether the accusatory style of interrogation, which
includes minimization and other tactics, causes false confessions. See infra note 15. This article focuses only on
moral minimization and our contribution lies in identifying two novel adverse consequences of that tactic.
6
See infra Part II-A-1.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 179-193.
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undermine the offenders’ neutralizations of the crime. We have reason to
expect that contrary efforts to endorse and reinforce neutralizations during
interrogation will promote recidivism.
The entrapment defense also illustrates the criminogenic risks of
minimization.8 Entrapment doctrine presupposes that the words and deeds
of undercover agents can persuade law-abiding individuals to commit
crimes they would otherwise not commit. Some of the most prominent
judicial decisions ruling in favor of defendants find entrapment plausible
because undercover operatives made appeals to moral values other than law,
which is to say, they made appeals that neutralized the immorality of the
crime. Under existing doctrine, courts would consider it a fact favorable to
the defense that an undercover operative encouraged a theft by saying
“anyone” with equivalent family obligations would commit the crime, as in
the first script above (even if that fact alone was insufficient for the
defense). The same criminogenic risk that exists in some undercover
operations exists in some interrogations.
Beyond neutralization, we rely on the social norms literature and the
legal legitimacy literature to support our criminogenic claim. Research on
social norms finds that people are more likely to obey the law if they
believe that others are obeying the law and will informally sanction them
for violations.9 Moral minimization makes this less likely. Because suspects
expect police detectives, as much as or more than anyone, to disapprove of
felonies, a detective’s statements trivializing and rationalizing a felony can
persuade the suspect that even the police don’t take this seriously, which
implies that almost no one else does. And when detectives minimize by
saying that the crime is common and/or that “anyone” would have
committed it under the circumstances, the desire to reciprocate compliance
with compliance is weakened.
Lastly, research on legal legitimacy finds that people are more likely
to obey the criminal law and cooperate with law enforcement if they
perceive law to be legitimate.10 Yet the moral minimization of a crime
8

See infra text accompanying notes 194-207.
See infra text accompanying notes 210-222.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 223-229.
9
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effectively critiques the law that defines the crime for its failure to track
moral intuitions shared by the perpetrator and (supposedly) police
detectives. If anyone would have stolen from their employer under the
circumstances, then the law is arbitrary to treat it as a felony. Persuading
suspects of this critique damages the law’s legitimacy.
Each of these five discourses – neutralization theory, restorative
justice research, entrapment doctrine, social norms theory, and legitimacy
theory – point in the same direction: moral minimization undermines
internal and informal motivations for legal compliance. The tactic is
criminogenic. No one has previously noted this risk. As we explain, moral
minimization is most likely to encourage recidivism when the offender’s
motivation to comply with criminal law is real but marginal (i.e., someone
who may offend but still experiences guilt and shame for offending) and the
minimizations are generalizable (i.e., applicable to future criminal
opportunities), conditions that apply frequently to crimes like theft, assault,
and sexual assault.11 These conditions are less likely to apply to certain
offenses, such as homicide, for reasons we explore. But the fact that no one
has ever considered these risks makes it certain that police currently use the
tactic in some cases where the criminogenic costs substantially exceed the
interrogation benefits.
We consider various objections to our claim, most prominently the
possibility that the subsequent prosecution, conviction, and punishment of
the offender will undo any criminogenic effects of moral minimization by
sending a counter-message validating the moral seriousness of the offense
and the offender’s responsibility. This objection is not compelling.12
Briefly, not everyone who is interrogated is prosecuted or convicted. For
those who are, they have a choice of which message to believe, an affirming
one they first heard from police detectives and a negative one they may
infer from prosecution. At best, there is a compromise between the two
messages, so the minimization message dilutes the responsibility message.
At worst, and more likely, those convicted of crime are subject to
confirmation bias, seeking to maintain a positive self-image by making
11
12

See infra Part II-B.
See infra Part II-C.
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every possible inference to confirm the earlier message of moral
minimization. Instead of inferring that the judge’s criminal sentence
disproves the detective’s minimizations, the punished offender may infer
that the detective articulated community mores more accurately than does
the law. Sometimes the criminal law does fail to track common moral
intuitions, so the offender is free to reason, self-servingly, that this is one of
those occasions. We consider specific actors in the system – attorneys,
judges, jurors, and victims – and conclude that none of them are likely to
send an effective counter-message that offsets the detective’s moral
minimization and undoes its criminogenic damage, at least not when, as is
currently the case, there is no awareness of the risks that minimization
poses.
That moral minimization is criminogenic is just one of its
unintended adverse consequences. The second one is the effect the tactic
has on interrogators. Here we focus narrowly on the minimization tactic of
victim-blaming, especially for crimes of violence against women. These
tactics likely reinforce hyper-masculine police culture.13 Many observers
point to this culture as a reason that police departments so frequently fail to
believe women victims and fail to effectively investigate sexual assault and
domestic violence cases. The misogynistic tropes employed in victimblaming interrogation tactics are a symptom of the cultural problem and a
barrier to correcting it. The training in and practice of victim-blaming in
interrogations support hyper-masculine culture by encouraging selfselection into detective work of those for whom the sexist tropes are least
repellent or even congenial. The experience of empathetically blaming
victims in order to appeal to suspects may also, over time, persuade some
detectives to move closer to believing what they pretend to believe. In short,
the second unintended cost of moral minimization is that it contributes to
the cultural problems that make it difficult for police to take crimes against
women seriously. No one has previously considered the consequences of
moral minimization on the interrogators.
In sum, the interrogation tactic of moral minimization has
unexpected costs and, as we also show, entirely uncertain benefits.
13

See infra Part III.
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Although we consider how to develop better counter-messaging to blunt the
criminogenic effects, such counter-messaging can never entirely undo the
damage and, in any event, does nothing to address the effects of victimblaming on interrogators. We conclude in favor of a consequential change
in modern interrogation regulation: the restriction or partial ban of moral
minimization.
Before we proceed, however, we should acknowledge and
distinguish other interrogation issues. The vast legal scholarship on
interrogation focuses mostly on the constitutional doctrines that define the
admissibility of confession evidence in criminal trials.14 Other legal
scholarship and most social science research on interrogation focuses on the
causes and consequences of false confessions.15 These important literatures
sometimes discuss specific interrogation tactics, including minimization.16
To the extent that moral minimization contributes to false confessions, then
our article reinforces the risks of such tactics. But the unexpected costs we

14
See generally ED HAGEN & DAVID M. NISSMAN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS (2021 ed.) (summarizing the law in
876 pages). Much of the legal literature concerns Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Symposium,
Entering the Second Fifty Years of Miranda, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017). Even though Miranda eclipsed the
due process voluntariness test in practical importance, that test remains as an independent means of challenging the
admissibility of confessions. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Eve Brensike Primus, The
Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. LAW REV. 1 (2015). There is also
a separate Sixth Amendment right to counsel during questioning after the initiation of formal adversary proceedings.
See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During
Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 381 (2009).
15
From the legal academy, see, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS 120-43 (2012) (chapter 5 on interrogating suspects and the problem of false confessions); Brandon L.
Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) (demonstrating the problem of police
contamination during interrogation). From the social sciences, see, e.g., Christian A. Meissner, et al., The Need for
a Positive Psychological Approach and Collaborative Effort for Improving Practice in the Interrogation Room, 34
LAW & HUM BEHAV 43 (2010) (reviewing the psychology literature on the causes of false confessions); Saul M.
Kassin, et al., On the General Acceptance of Confessions Research: Opinions of the Scientific Community, 73
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 63 (2018) (reporting on survey of 87 experts on the psychology of confessions to identify
scientific consensus, including on the causes of false confessions); Brent Snook, et al., Urgent Issues and Prospects
in Reforming Interrogation Practices in the United States and Canada, 26 LEGAL & CRIMINOL. PSYCH. 1, 10-11
(2021) (discussing what each of 11 authors views as the critical research and reform issues in the psychology of
interrogation).
16
To ensure admissibility, police interrogators generally avoid specific promises of leniency in prosecution
and sentencing (see, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (stating that confessions are
“inadmissible if made under any . . . promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor”), but minimizing tactics may
imply a promise of leniency. See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 239 (1991); Snook et
al., supra note 15, at 14-15. Also, maximizing tactics, by which interrogators assert total confidence in the suspect’s
guilt and their ability to prove it, even by false claims regarding the evidence, can induce false confessions. See,
e.g., Allyson J. Horgan et al, Minimization & Maximization Techniques: Assessing the Perceived Consequences of
Confessing and Confession Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCH., CRIME & L. 65, 66 (2012) (finding that false evidence can
trigger false confessions to experimental rule violations).
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discuss are distinct from what has been previously considered in
interrogation scholarship, doctrinal or social science.17
We proceed as follows. Part I describes moral minimization and the
evidence that police detectives employ the tactic extensively. From the case
law, we show the exact wording of real world minimizations, with an
emphasis on how detectives blame victims. Part II explores the tactic’s
criminogenic risks, investigating the five discourses just described. We
identify the factors that determine the magnitude of the risk and answer the
objection that the criminal process undoes the damage of moral
minimization. Part III explores the tactic’s risks for policing and policing
culture, i.e., how the training and practice of stereotypical victim-blaming
pushes against effective investigation of crimes against those who are
stereotyped, particularly women. Part IV addresses the normative
implications – what should be done to limit the risks of moral minimization.
Part V concludes.
I. MORAL MINIMIZATION IN AMERICAN POLICE INTERROGATIONS
Every day, American law enforcement seeks to convince suspected
offenders that the crimes they are believed to have committed are not
morally serious and caused no real harm. Just as often, American detectives
work to persuade suspects that the true blame for their crime rests with
someone else, usually the victim. To document this strange state of affairs,
and publicize an understudied policing strategy, this Part reviews the theory
and practice of American interrogation methods, with an emphasis on moral
minimization.
The United States and a few other nations predominantly employ a
“confrontational” or “accusatory” method of interrogation, in contrast to the
“information-gathering” methods favored by the United Kingdom and other

17
A partial exception is Anne Coughlin, who drew attention to the misogynistic tropes in rape interrogations
and “speculat[ed]” about the effect on rapists. See Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599,
1599 (2009). Coughlin’s focus is different than ours in various ways, as her concern is limited to the crime of rape,
she does not discuss the general tactic of “minimization,” and her framework is narrative theory rather than
neutralization or the other social science theories we employ.
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nations.18 The confrontational method prominently includes the tactics
known as maximization and minimization. For the former, interrogators
maximize the apparent certainty they have of the suspect’s guilt, suggesting
that the evidence is decisive, cutting off and rejecting protestations of
innocence, and on some occasions falsely describing evidence of guilt.19 For
minimization, interrogators suggest mitigating factors for the suspect’s
crime, which make it less legally or morally wrong or even fully justified.
Within the category of minimization, our focus is on moral
minimizations. We define that subcategory in Part A. Part B explores the
content of the tactic, relying on widely used interrogation manuals. Part C
documents the extensive use of moral minimization in real world
interrogations based on surveys, observational studies, and especially case
law. Part D roughly estimates how frequently detectives morally minimize
criminal offenses each year in the United States.
A. Moral Minimization Defined
Although the training manuals we survey below do not explicitly
make the distinction, there are two principal types of minimization: legal
and moral. Legal minimization suggests to suspects that the crime may not
be as legally serious as they believe or perhaps they have a legally valid
defense. In a homicide investigation, for example, the detective may suggest
that the suspect could have killed the victim accidentally or in self-defense,
though the manuals advise caution when relying on a theme that implies
official leniency, given that courts may exclude confessions produced by
false promises of prosecutorial leniency.20 Nonetheless, where the strategy
is used, investigators hope to get closer to confessions by inviting suspects
to accept a version of the facts that appears to lessen their legal liability
while nonetheless connecting them to the crime.

18
See Christian A. Meissner, et al., Improving the Effectiveness of Suspect Interrogations, 11 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 211, 216 (“One primary distinction has been proposed between the use of accusatorial approaches in
North America and the development of information-gathering approaches in the United Kingdom, Australia, and
elsewhere.”).
19
See SIMON, supra note 15, at 135 (explaining maximization tactics as including, in the absence of “powerful
incriminating evidence,” that “interrogators often fabricate it and deceive the suspect into believing it exists”).
20
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203, 425; BRIAN JAYNE & JOSEPH BUCKLEY, A FIELD GUIDE TO THE REID
TECHNIQUE 277-79 (2014) [hereinafter JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE] “[T]he theme should not provide the
suspect with a legal defense for his criminal behavior.” Id. at 276.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4044000

Etienne & McAdams

10

[Spring 2022]

Moral minimization, however, is our focus. With moral
minimization, the interrogator seeks to persuade the suspect that, whatever
the law might say, her conduct is morally excused or justified, at least to
some degree, so the crime is not a serious moral transgression. Decades ago,
the Supreme Court in Miranda described this technique in its review of
interrogation practices: “Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad
family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an
unrequited desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on
society.”21 Miranda illustrated the technique with facts from its 1954 case
of Leyra v. Denno,22 where an interrogator (a psychiatrist) had said to the
accused, “We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a fit of temper
or anger we sometimes do things we aren't really responsible for,” and
again, “We know that morally you were just in anger. Morally, you are not
to be condemned.”23
We explore examples below. Dan Simon summarizes: Minimization
is “achieved by means of presenting the suspect with a theme that reduces
the import of the crime. Themes usually convey the interrogator’s opinion
that the crime was not so serious, that the victim deserved his fate, or that
anyone else would have acted in the same way.”24
The remainder of this part demonstrates the nature and frequency of
moral minimization.
B. The Reid Interrogation Manuals and Moral Minimization
To move beyond generalities, we explore the most influential
interrogation manuals, those defining the “Reid” technique.25 Miranda
21

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966).
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
23
Appendix to Opinion of the Court, id. at 562, 582; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 n.12.
24
SIMON, supra note 15, at 135. See also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 540 n.2 (Mass.
2004) (Spina, J., dissenting) (“‘Minimization’ is a ‘soft-sell’ technique in which the police interrogator tries to lull
the suspect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance, face-saving excuses, and even moral
justification, by blaming a victim or accomplice, by citing extenuating circumstances, or by playing down the
seriousness of the charges.”) (quoting Kassin & McNall, supra note 16, at 235)).
25
See Dylan J. French, The Cutting Edge of Confession Evidence: Redefining Coercion and Reforming Police
Interrogation Techniques in the American Criminal Justice System, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2019) (“While
there are different styles of accusatory interrogation, all major tropes can be traced back to a man named John E.
22
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relied on, among other sources, the second edition of the police training
guide by Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, titled Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.26 At the time, Chief Justice Warren noted that the three leading
texts on interrogation – two of which were authored by Inbau, Reid and
their associates – had total combined sales and circulation of over 44,000.27
John E. Reid & Associates, Inc. remains the leading authority on police
interrogations, through its multiple training manuals28 and courses.29 Since
Miranda, the Supreme Court has twice referenced Reid interrogation
manuals, reflecting its dominant position in the field.30 Reid states that
“hundreds of thousands of investigators have received [its] training,”31 a
claim substantiated by an independent survey of law enforcement
personnel, which found that over half had received instruction on the Reid
technique.32 Criminal Interrogation and Confession is now in its fifth
edition, published in 2013, and we refer to it as “the manual.” (Importantly
Reid and his original work . . . . [T]he Reid Manual, affectionately known as the Interrogator's Bible, has set the
standard.”).
26
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49 n.9 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (2nd ed. 1962), and noting that the first edition of the Inbau and Reid manual
was a revision and enlargement of an earlier text by the authors, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
(3d ed. 1953)).
27
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49 n.9.
28
The primary manual is the newest edition of the one Miranda cited: INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1. A separate
abridged version is FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, ESSENTIALS OF THE
REID TECHNIQUE: CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INBAU, ET AL.,
ESSENTIALS]. There are at least four related texts published by John E. Reid and Associates, Inc., some in the second
edition: BRIAN C. JAYNE & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, THE INVESTIGATOR ANTHOLOGY (2d ed. 2014) (described as “a
compilation of articles and essays about The Reid Technique”) [hereinafter JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY];
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY]; JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20; LOUIS C. SENESE, ANATOMY
OF INTERROGATION THEMES: THE REID TECHNIQUE OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (2d ed. 2020); and
DAVID M. BUCKLEY, HOW TO IDENTIFY, INTERVIEW, AND MOTIVATE CHILD ABUSE OFFENDERS TO TELL THE
TRUTH (2d ed. 2015).
29
See also SIMON, supra note 15, at 121-22 (“[U]sed most widely by American law enforcement agencies . .
. the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation has been taught to well over 100,000 law enforcement
agents.”). In addition to its books and DVDs, Reid offers training seminars and certificate training programs through
its Institute. See Store, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS, INC. (last visited Jan. 21, 2022), https://reid.com/store/products.
30
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 610 n.2 (2004) (citing two Reid manuals and one other to show what
“[m]ost police manuals” advise about Miranda warnings); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994) (citing
the Reid manual as evidence that an aspect of Miranda doctrine was “well settled”).
31
See INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at viii. Beyond law enforcement, the method is popular with
private security personnel employed to detect and prevent theft and fraud. See “How to Conduct Better Interviews
& Interrogations,” Security Director's Report of the Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA), issue 0212, p.11 (December 2002) (“When asked which vendors they rely on most for building their own skills and that of
staff, a whopping 80% of security pros cited John E. Reid & Associates.”).
32
See N. Dickon, Reppucci, et al., Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles: Results on a National Survey of
Police, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 67 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds. 2010) (reporting that 54% of respondents
had been trained in the Reid technique). See also Melissa B. Russano et al., Structured Interviews of Experienced
HUMINT Interrogators, 28 APPL. COG. PSYCH. 847, 848-50 (2014) (reporting on a survey of 42 experienced federal
interrogators, half from law enforcement and half from the military, in which 50% indicated they had received
formal training in the Reid technique, the highest percentage of any source).
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for our focus on moral minimization, even the competitors of the Reid
technique often use this particular tactic33).
The Reid Technique has nine steps.34 Step one is the direct, positive
confrontation, in which the detective expresses confidence in the guilt of the
suspect.35 Step two – our subject – is “Theme Development.”36 The term
“theme” refers only to what we call moral minimization; the manual
explains that a “theme” is a “monologue presented by the interrogator in
which reasons and excuses are offered that will serve to psychologically
justify or minimize the moral seriousness of the suspect’s criminal
behavior.”37 The Reid manual explains that ‘it is natural for [the offender]
to justify or rationalize the crime in some manner” and that “[m]ost
interrogation themes reinforce the guilty suspect’s own rationalizations and
justifications for committing the crime”38 “Psychologists refer to this
internal process [of rationalization] as techniques of neutralization,”39 a
topic to which we will return.
Developing this kind of minimizing theme takes time, which is why
the manual describes it as a “monologue.” “For a theme to be effective, the
investigator must be able to maintain a continuous monologue of theme
33
For example, the Zulawski & Wicklander interrogation method differs in critical ways from the Reid
Technique, but the former also devote a chapter to “rationalizations,” which are essentially moral minimizations.
See DAVID E. ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION
305 (2d ed. 2002) (recommending a “one-sided discussion presented to the suspect by the interrogator, who offers
excuses or reasons that minimize the seriousness of the crime.”). The corporation, Wicklander-Zulawski &
Associates, Inc., parted ways with the Reid method in 2017 over concerns that it leads to false confessions. See Liz
Martinez, Security, Law Enforcement React to Change in U.S. Interrogation Technique: Wicklander-Zulawski
Decision to Drop the ‘Reid Method' Has Generated Mixed Opinions, SECURITYINFOWATCH.COM (Mar. 10, 2017),
at
https://www.securityinfowatch.com/security-executives/article/12314618/security-law-enforcement-react-tochange-in-us-interrogation-technique. Nonetheless, there remains considerable inertia favoring the Reid technique.
See id. (quoting a past president of an organization for security professionals: “I have some doubts about the success
of implementation because the new police officers hitting the streets today have been trained on the Reid method.
It will take attrition – years or maybe decades . . . because of resistance to a new method.”). In any event, the
Wicklander-Zulawski shift does not abandon their focus on “rationalizations.”
34
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 187-90.
35
Id., at 192-98.
36
Id. at 202-55; INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 115-35. See also SENESE, supra note 28, which
is a 342-page supplemental manual devoted entirely to “interrogation themes.”
37
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 115.
38
Id. See also id. at 210 (“The interrogation theme represents a persuasive effort on the part of the investigator
to reinforce those existing excuses or rationalizations within the guilty suspect’s mind”); JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD
GUIDE, supra note 20, at 276 (“For a guilty suspect to relate to an interrogation theme, the justifications offered by
the investigator must be similar to how the suspect himself justified the crime.”).
39
Id. at n.7, 325-26 (emphasis added) (citing MICHAEL J. LILLYQUIST, UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 153-60 (1980) and Heith Copes, et al., Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice:
How Neutralization Theory Can Inform Reid Interrogations of Identity Thieves, 18 J.CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 444 (2007).
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material.”40 During an interrogation that may last hours, “[t]he investigator
must continue offering the suspect a theme.”41 To avoid a theme statement
that “only lasts a few minutes,” the manuals offer several ways to “draw out
the length of a theme.”42
The manuals offer specific minimization themes. First is
“Sympathize with the Suspect by Saying That Anyone Else Under Similar
Conditions or Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing.”43 Inbau
and co-authors explain: “A criminal offender . . . derives considerable
mental relief and comfort from the investigator’s assurance that anyone else
under similar conditions or circumstances might have done the same
thing.”44 The manual cautions against promising legal leniency, but notes:
“There is, of course, no legal objection to extending sympathy and
understanding in order to feed into the suspect’s own justifications for his
criminal behavior . . . .”45
The manual offers two illustrations. One concerns a hit-and-run
suspect, and this script is said to be drawn from an actual case: “Your car
hit something. You were not sure what it was, but you had some doubts; so
you got excited and drove away . . . . You are no different than anyone else
and, under the same circumstances, I probably would have done what you
yourself did.”46 The second example concerns sexual assault, where the
manual advises “indicat[ing] to the suspect that the investigator has a friend
or relative who indulged in the same kind of conduct . . . [I] t may even be
appropriate for the investigator himself to acknowledge that he has been
tempted to indulge in the same behavior.”47 There is a recommended script
– that “one of the authors used” – referring to the interrogator’s sister:
40

JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY, supra note 28, at 165.
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 271 (offering to answer the question “How can a theme
last 30, 60, or even 90 minutes?”).
42
JAYNE & BUCKLEY, ANTHOLOGY, supra note 28, at 165 (section titled “Expanding the Duration of the
Theme”). Part of the technique here is to present some themes as not being about the suspect (and his or her
motivation), but about third parties or personal stories of the interrogator. Id.
43
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 210.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 211.
46
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
47
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 211 (emphasis added). We shall discuss a California case where the detective
followed this advice. See Gomez v. California, No. 1:18-cv-00642-DAD-SAB-HC, 2019 WL 358631, at *11 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 29, 2019) (noting that the detective said to a sexual assault suspect: “‘You're a man. And that I get. It's
happened to me.’”), discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-119. See also Coughlin, supra note 17, at 165041
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I’ve got a sister who used to get all dressed up and go to
these singles bars. She’d pick a guy out and talk real
intimately with him while he was buying her drinks. At the
end of the evening the guy, of course, would try to get her
alone in his car or apartment. She usually ended up driving
herself home, which, obviously, made the guy pretty upset. I
think in your situation this gal allowed the relationship to get
much closer than what my sister did and, we both know,
guys reach a certain point of no return.48
The Reid manual’s second minimization theme is: “Reduce the
Suspect’s Feeling of Guilt by Minimizing the Moral Seriousness of the
Offense.”49 The initial illustration is, again, sexual assault, where the
manual offers the following script, “has been found effective”:
In matters of sex, we’re very close to most animals, so don’t
think you’re the only human being – or that your one of a
very few – who ever did anything like this. There are plenty
of others, and these things happen every day and to many
persons, and they will continue to happen for many, many
years to come.50
The manual also refers to an actual spousal murder case in which
“the deceased wife had treated her husband miserably over the years” and
the interrogator’s theme was as follows:
Joe, as recently as just last week, my wife made me so angry
with her nagging that I felt I couldn’t stand it anymore, but
just as she was at her worst, there was a ringing of the
51 (describing how the third edition of the Reid manual recounted a case in which the interrogator stated that he
“himself, as a young man in high school, ‘roughed it up’ with a girl in an attempt to have intercourse with her.”).
48
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 211.
49
Id. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 317 (explaining that “the interrogator also
minimizes the seriousness of the crime from the suspect’s perspective. . . . saying, ‘And sometimes it’s really nothing
more than an error in judgment, a mistake’”) and 331 (“Nobody is perfect. A lot of time, our mistakes seem a lot
bigger than they probably are.”).
50
Id. at 211-12. This script has been in the Reid manuals since the first edition. See FRED. E. INBAU & JOHN
E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 36 (1962) [hereinafter INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION].
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doorbell by friends from out of town. Was I glad they came!
Otherwise, I don’t know what I would have done. You were
not so lucky as I was on that occasion.51
If this gendered script sounds like it comes from an earlier era, that’s
because the example has been used without alteration since the first edition
of the Reid manual in 1962 (as is true for many of the examples).52
The final illustration of this second theme involves employee theft
crimes, where the manual recommends using statistics on the ubiquity of
such crimes. For example, to minimize the seriousness of stealing from an
employer, the interrogator could invoke the claim noted in one Reid manual
that “75% of employees steal from the workplace” and that “most do so
repeatedly.”53
The third specific minimization theme is: “Suggest a Less Revolting
and More Morally Acceptable Motivation or Reason for the Offense than
That Which is Known or Presumed.”54 The manual offers several
illustrations including that the suspect committed the crime only because
alcohol or drugs had impaired his judgment, that a suspected embezzler
only intended to borrow the money and would have replaced it if not for the
discovery, and that a thief took “money . . . for the benefit of a spouse,
child, or another person.”55 The manual offers a table listing self-serving
motives that offenders have offered during confessions for each of eleven
different crimes.56
51

INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 212.
See INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION, supra note 50, at 37.
53
See SENESE, supra note 28, at 141. The main manual includes a lower estimate of one-third of all employees.
INBAU, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION, supra note 28, at 213-14 (listing a number of bullet points about the high
frequency of employee theft). One of the non-Reid manuals notes how easy it is for employees to rationalize
workplace theft. See ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 306.
54
Id. at 214.
55
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 215. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 339
(recommending that the interrogator “minimizes the loss” by suggesting that the suspect “had intended to return the
money or property” and was only borrowing it). See also id. at 332 (“Medical bills, family problems, and financial
pressures are things that can push a person into doing something he never dreamed he would do. We all have our
breaking points.”). This family motive, when genuine, and especially in extreme cases, would actually mitigate the
offense in a way that a judge should consider in sentencing. If the criminal system will actually reduce the sentence
because of a mitigating factor, there is no harm to interrogation that incorporates that mitigation (or any other such
genuine factor). We note, however, that few of the moral minimizations are relevant in this way. Efforts to trivialize
the offense and blame the victim fall outside of a legitimate sentencing judgment.
56
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 216-17. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 325 (“First,
the interrogator might use frustration at being unable to control the child’s crying . . . [and second] the strength of
52
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The fourth specific theme merits special attention: “Sympathize with
the Suspect by Condemning Others,” a subpart of which is “Condemning
the victim.”57 “[T]he investigator should develop the theme that the primary
blame, or at least some of the blame, for what the suspect did rests upon the
victim.”58 Or, as the manual puts it at one point, the strategy is to
“degrad[e] the character of the victim.”59
There are suggestions here for blaming victims of assault and
robbery.60 Referencing again “the case of a man suspected of killing his
wife,” the manual says that the investigator portrayed the suspect’s wife as
an “unbearable”
creature . . . who would either drive a man insane or else to
the commission of an act such as the present one in which
she herself was the victim. In this respect, however, the
investigator stated that the suspect’s wife was just like most
other women. He also said that many married men avoid
similar difficulties by becoming drunkards, cheats, and
deserters, but unfortunately the suspect tried to do what was
right by ‘sticking it out,’ and it got the better of him in the
end.”61
In making such misogynistic appeals, the manual recommends empathy:
The investigator should condemn the wife for her conduct,
making the point that, by her own conduct, she herself had
an adult and the fragility of a small child.”).
57
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 220. The other suggestions are “Condemning the accomplice” and
“Condemning anyone else upon whom some degree of moral responsibility might conceivably be placed.” Id. at
224, 227. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 306 (advising “the interrogator to create the
perception of transferring guilt to someone . . . other than the suspect. . . . [thereby] psychologically minimizing the
seriousness of the suspect’s offense.”).
58
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 220. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 333-34 (noting
that “[t]he victim can be blamed in almost any crime from homicide to a sex crime to theft. The guilt is transferred
to the victim by the interrogator, who portrays the suspect as a victim of circumstances.”).
59
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 222 (emphasis added).
60
See id. (“In assault cases, the victim may be referred to as someone who . . . finally got what was coming to
him.”) and id. (“In a robbery case, the victim may be blamed for having previously cheated the suspect . . . [or] for
‘flashing money’ or putting the suspect down in front of friends.”).
61
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 148-49.
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brought on the incident of the killing. . . . [M]uch can be
gained by the investigator’s adoption of an emotional
(‘choked up’) feeling about it all as he relates what is known
about the victim’s conduct toward her spouse. This
demonstrable attitude of sympathy and understanding may
be rather easily assumed by placing one’s self ‘in the other
fellow’s shoes’ and pondering this question: ‘What might I
have done under similar circumstances’?62
Although there is no separate example for domestic battery (as
opposed to domestic murder), the manual’s logic of victim-blaming
endorses the same approach there as well.
Regarding sex offenses, the suggested blame-the-victim theme is:
“The victim initially came on to the suspect and he acted the way any man
would under the circumstances.”63 The Reid manual offers two such scripts.
One was the rape example given in the introduction.64 The other focuses on
clothing:
Joe, no woman should be on the street alone at night looking
as sexy as she did. Even here today, she’s got on a low-cut
dress that makes visible damn near all her breasts. That’s
wrong! It’s too much of a temptation for any normal man. If
she hadn’t gone around dressed like that you wouldn’t be in
this room now.65
The Reid manuals recommend similar themes when the sexual abuse victim
is a child.66
62

INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1 at 221 (emphasis added).
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 204 (emphasis added).
64
See supra text accompanying note 2.
65
Id. at 221. This example dates back to the original 1962 edition, INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION, supra note
52, at 45-46. See also INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 204 (“Suggested theme: Having sexual contact with a child
the age of the victim (who was nine years old) is much more understandable than if the suspect had the same contact
with a two-year-old girl.”); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 334 (“The suspect became involved
because the victim dressed or acted in a certain way.”).
66
In the supplemental Reid manual specific to child abuse, BUCKLEY, supra note 28, there are examples that
seem to distinguish the suspect’s “perception” from reality, id. at 220, but other recommended themes lack this
nuance: “Blame the child’s curiosity; they brought up the subject of sex.” Id. at 223, and “Present the argument that
children are more mature in today’s society . . . due to television, movies, magazines, news reports, the internet and
63
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The manual offers another means of blaming the rape victim:
“Where circumstances permit,” propose “that the rape victim had acted like
she might have been a prostitute and that the suspect had assumed she was a
willing partner.”67 These examples are from the current edition of the main
manual published in 2013, which is before the greater salience of the “Me
Too” movement. However, a more recent supplemental Reid text from 2020
provides similar examples and states that “the most common theme to
develop in sexual assaults is to blame the victim for doing something that
provoked the suspect.”68
Given the recommendation of misogynistic insults of victims, one
wonders whether racial or other stereotypes are also used as a minimization
theme. Interestingly, the current edition of the main Reid manual
comprehensively ignores the issue of race,69 a curious omission in light of
(a) its frequent endorsement of sexist stereotypes and (b) a brief reference to
race in earlier editions.70 The primary Reid manual does not address hate
crimes, but the obvious logic of victim-blaming in these cases is clear: if
rape crimes require misogynistic themes, as the manuals claim, then hate
social media. They are exposed to sex at an early age and are curious to experiment with sex.” Id. See also ZULAWSKI
& WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 334 (“The interrogator can even blame a child victim of sexual abuse for
appearing older and tempting the suspect.”).
67
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 222.
68
See SENESE, supra note 28, at 224 (first emphasis added; second in original). The book is more exhaustive
on the subject of minimization themes than the main manual. Senese offers various ways to minimize the seriousness
of sexual assault, including that the suspect was under in the influence of alcohol. Id. at 226-26 (items 4 and 17).
Senese also lists a longer series of specific victim-blaming “rape themes,” such as “Blame the victim’s style of dress
for leading the suspect on,” “Blame the victim’s actions and or behavior, such as . . . Flirting with the suspect,” and
“Suggest the suspect may have been mistreated by the opposite sex his entire life, thus blaming women in general.”
Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added). For the separate crime of indecent exposure, see also id. at 186-87.
69
There is no entry on the subject of race in the index of a 450+ page book.
70
In the first edition of the Reid Manual, in 1962, at 115, there was a section titled “An Unintelligent,
Uneducated Criminal Offender, with a Low Cultural Background, Should Be Interrogated on a Psychological Level
Comparable to That Usually Employed in the Questioning of a Child Respecting an Act of Wrongdoing.” One
passage of that section raised the issue of race:
In instances where a subject of the type of under consideration happens to be a member
of a minority race or group, the interrogator must never make a derogatory remark about that
race or group. (Nor should he assume that a person's attitude, conduct, or even his criminality
are the result of the color of his skin or his nationality!) To the contrary, the interrogator
should (and in good conscience he always can) eulogize some outstanding member of that
race or group and suggest that the subject try to measure up to the conduct exemplified by
that particular individual.
Id. at 116. The same text exists in the second edition of 1966, but the entire section is omitted starting with
the third edition of 1986. While we applaud the statement that the interrogator should not assume that race
determines criminality, we find it disturbing that race was discussed in the book only in reference to “unintelligent”
suspects “with a Low Cultural Background.”
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crimes would seem to require racist, homophobic, or Islamophobic themes,
or others of a similar nature, whatever might have motivated the suspect to
commit the crime. Moreover, this logic seems to apply not just to what are
technically hate-crimes but to any crime where the suspect and victim are of
different races (or ethnicities, religions, etc.) because the suspect might have
rationalized the offense with bigoted and stereotyped reasoning. If a simple
theft crime is cross-racial, for example, a detective following the technique
might experiment with a theme that members of the victim’s racial (or
other) group have plenty of money to spare or acquire their money by
nefarious means.
In any event, one supplemental Reid manual does address hate
crimes. Besides offering various ways to minimize the moral seriousness of
a hate crime,71 the manual says that “the primary themes” should “address
the specific motive – namely, the offender’s bias or attitudes toward the
specific person or group.”72 The manual offers specific ideas for using that
motive to shift blame away from the suspect, including:
8. Blame the liberal politicians for creating an unfair
situation by ‘selling out’ for the vote by enacting laws that
favor the victimized individual’s group[;]
9. Blame the fact that the victim’s clothing suggested a racial
or religious bias[;]
10. Blame the victim’s behavior, i.e., being arrogant, cocky,
antagonistic, confrontational, aggressive, etc.[;]
11. Blame the government for reverse discrimination[;] . . .
32. Compliment the suspect for standing up for his
rights/beliefs and not being hypocritical[;]
33. Compliment the suspect for standing up for the ‘silent
majority[.]’73

71
For examples, see id. at 171 (“Suggest that the suspect believed he was exercising his right of freedom of
speech/expression,” minimize the frequency of the behavior).
72
SENESE, supra note 28, at 169.
73
Id. at 170-72. These themes are all for “[h]ate crimes against individuals.” Id. at 169. There are another set
for hate crimes against property, which include ‘[b]lam[ing] the victim” for “using his property as an obnoxious or
offensive display of his lifestyle/behavior,” or “[b]laming the victim’s property as being an ‘eyesore’ or blemishing
a nice neighborhood or lowering property values.” Id. at 172 (examples B3 and B4).
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It is difficult for us to see how an interrogator could implement these
victim-blaming themes without endorsing the suspect’s negative
stereotypes. Notice that the tenth example uses most of the possible
synonyms for “uppity,” a racist code word for non-subservient African
Americans. The thirty-second example is to compliment a hate crime
suspect for “standing up for his . . . beliefs,” when the relevant beliefs are
inevitably negative stereotypes based on race, religion, or sexual
orientation. The manual avoids confronting these issues by offering only a
single script, which concerns an assault of a gay man. In the script, the
interrogator tells the suspect that the victim “should have recognized” that
the suspect did “not agree with [his] alternate lifestyle,” but that the victim
“began to talk back to you and before you knew it, you struck him.”74 The
script arguably avoids negative stereotyping (though arguably not), but only
by avoiding the use of almost all the theme suggestions just quoted.
Theft cases are another opportunity for victim-blaming. For
employee theft cases, the primary manual states: “[T]he employer should be
condemned for having paid inadequate and insufficient salaries or for some
unethical or careless practice that may have created a temptation to steal.”75
We saw one such script in the introduction.76 Another suggests proposing to
a maid accused of theft that she stole fur coats because the owner had so
many and didn’t treat them well.77
Finally, the Reid manuals also recommend casting blame on targets
other than the victim – accomplices, society, government, parents, or other
relatives.78 For example, when the suspect is a juvenile, blame the parents,
suggesting that the suspect was “worse off than an orphan.”79 “When the
74

Id. at 172-73.
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 222. See also id. at 204 (“[B]lame the company for their poor security.”); id.
at 223 (“[A]n employer may be blamed for some perceived unfair treatment of the suspect”); ZULAWSKI &
WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 312 (recommending “rationalizations that placed blame on financial problems”
caused by medical problems); id. at 333 (“Bob, if this happened out of frustration because of the way your boss
picked on you”).
76
See supra text accompanying note 1.
77
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 223. See also SENESE, supra note 28, at 141-47 (describing nineteen
minimization themes for employee theft, many involving victim-blaming); ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note
33, at 334 (“’Cindy, I don’t know how you can make it on just $7.00 per hour.’”); id. at 335 (recommending
interrogators blame the victim’s poor security as creating too great a temptation for theft).
78
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 224-30. See also ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 310
(recommending the blaming of parents for giving too much attention to the suspect’s sibling).
79
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 251.
75
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offense is theft,” blame “a spendthrift wife or the financial burden of a
child.”80 Or the suspect’s creditors may be blamed for pressuring for
repayment and “’forc[ing]’ him to steal.”81 Bringing in politics, the
suspected embezzler’s behavior may be compared favorably to the national
government’s behavior in “squeez[ing] citizens with burdensome taxes to
obtain money to waste on foreign countries.”82 In the actual wife-murder
interrogation, the investigator blamed the wife’s family for meddling,
stating “[a]t one point,” that “probably the relatives themselves deserved to
be shot.”83
Returning to sexual assault examples, the Reid manual offers a
variety of other targets for blame: pornography, the internet, or “differing
cultural beliefs.”84 “A person who has taken indecent sexual liberties with a
young girl may be told that her parents are to blame for letting her roam
around by herself as they did.”85 If the suspect is married, the interrogator
can cast blame on the suspect’s wife, as with this script: “If your wife had
taken care of you sexually . . . you wouldn’t be here now. You’re a healthy
male; you needed and were entitled to sexual intercourse. When a fellow
like you doesn’t get it at home, he seeks it elsewhere.”86
This final strategy of blaming women, like the others, comes from
the latest Reid manual published in 2013, though it also traces back to the
first edition of 1962.87

80

Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
82
Id. at 230.
83
Id. at 227.
84
See SENESE, supra note 28, at 226.
85
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 228. See also BUCKLEY, supra note 28 at 222 (“Blame the victim’s parents
for not showing any love or attention to the victim . . . . [or] allowing their child to spend the night, go on a camping
trip, ski outing, etc.”). This is in addition to blaming society and the media. Id. at 224.
86
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 228 (emphasis added). See also Buckley, supra note 28, at 222 (“This is
exemplified by offender #3 who had an incestuous relationship with his teenage daughters after his wife refused to
have sex with him . . . . In a case like this the investigator would suggest, ‘If your wife would have taken care of
you the way she was supposed to this would never have happened.”).
87
See INBAU & REID, FIRST EDITION, supra note 50, at 51-52.
81
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C. Moral Minimization in Real World Interrogations
Do police follow the manuals that recommend moral minimization?
A variety of evidence confirms that they do. David Simon, a journalistic
observer of the first order, famously spent a year embedded with the
homicide unit of the Baltimore Police Department.88 He described their
interrogation techniques, including moral minimization, as illustrated by the
child-murder examples quoted in the introduction.89 In the same passage,
Simon adds: “Kill your woman and a good detective will come close to real
tears as he touches your shoulder and tells you how he knows that you must
have loved her, that it wouldn’t be so hard for you to talk about if you
didn’t.”90
Simon did not quantify the number of interrogations he observed,
but in one study criminologist Richard Leo observed 182 felony
interrogations.91 Leo separately categorized two tactics that involve the type
of minimization that concerns us: (1) to “offer moral justifications or
psychological excuses” for the criminal conduct and (2) to “minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense.”92 Police offered moral justifications or
excuses in 34% of the interrogations, and minimized the crime’s moral
seriousness in 22%.93 Detectives use multiple tactics in any interrogation,
but we read these results to indicate that detectives minimized the crime’s
moral seriousness and/or offered moral justifications or excuses, such as
blame-shifting, in one third to one-half of interrogations.94
88

SIMON, supra note 3, at 212.
See supra text accompanying note 3.
90
Id.
91
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 266 (1996) [hereinafter
Interrogation Room] (reporting on 60 recorded interrogations from police departments in two small cities and 122
contemporaneously observed interrogations at a major urban police department).
92
Id. at 278 (table 5).
93
Id.
94
Subsequent observations report significantly different numbers, but confirm that minimization is a real
world tactic. In 2013, Barry Feld reported on his review of 307 delinquency files of sixteen and seventeen year olds
charged with felonies in Minnesota, and found that minimization was present in only 17% of interrogations. Barry
C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2013) (table
4). Most recently, Christopher Kelly and co-authors reviewed twenty-nine interrogations (totaling forty-five hours)
conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department in homicide, rape, and robbery cases, and found that interrogators
offered moral rationalizations in 83% (24 of 29) of the interrogations. Christopher E. Kelly, et al., On the Road (to
Admission): Engaging Suspects with Minimization, 25 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 166, 171 (2019) (Table 1). (These
researchers also coded the frequency of different interrogation tactics by examining each interview in 5-minute
segments. They found that detectives offered rationalizations in 4.7% of the 5-minute intervals, making it the sixth
89
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Second, consider a 2007 survey of law enforcement interrogators.95
Over six hundred law enforcement officers (574 members of sixteen U.S.
police departments plus 57 customs officials from two Canadian provinces)
answered questions on interrogation practices. The survey asked which of
sixteen tactics they employed using a five-point scale ranging from “never”
(1) to “always” (5).96 For the tactic “[o]ffering the suspect sympathy, moral
justifications and excuses,” the mean answer was 3.38, which falls between
“sometimes” (3) and “often” (4). Six percent answered this question by
saying they never used the tactic (1) and 13% by saying they always did
(5).97 For the tactic “[m]inimizing the moral seriousness of the offense,” the
mean response was 3.02, with 11% saying never and 8% saying always.98
Of the interrogation tactics that involve the substance of questions, these
two were the fifth and eighth most frequently employed tactics (where
investigators routinely employ multiple tactics in a given interrogation).99
The mean responses for these two tactics – within a range of “sometimes”
to “often” – are consistent with Leo’s study showing that the strategies were
employed in at least one-third of the cases.
A final source for confirming the use of minimization are the
judicial opinions discussing interrogations. Appellate opinions cannot give
us a reliable basis for estimating the frequency of station house
minimization. Not only are there the usual concerns that litigated appeals
may fail to represent cases not so litigated, but also note that moral
minimization is not usually relevant to the lawfulness of interrogation, so
defense lawyers have little reason to raise issues concerning its use.100
most frequently used tactic.) Id. at 172.
95
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and
Beliefs, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 385 (2007).
96
The other options for answering were 2 – rarely, 3 – sometimes, and 4 – often. Id. at 387.
97
Id. at 388, Table 2.
98
Id.
99
Including all tactics, those described in the text were still among the top ten of most frequently employed.
Id. See also Allison D. Redlich, et al., The Who, What, and Why of Human Intelligence Fathering: Self-Reported
Measures of Interrogation Methods, 28 APPLIED COG. PSYCH. 817 (2014) (finding similar frequency results from a
survey of 152 U.S. military and federal law enforcement about the use of “moral rationalizations” and
“minimization” (Table 1A, not reported in publication but shared by author Allison Redlich and on file).
100
See, e.g., United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 812 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that “statements . . .
minimizing the gravity of Jacques’s offense . . . fall safely within the realm of the permissible ‘chicanery’”). We
have found three state cases in which courts suppressing a confession recognized that minimization was one relevant
factor in a totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness. See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d
516, 525 (2004); State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 873 (Haw. 2020); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d 1229, 1241-42 (Kan.
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Nonetheless, the opinions do confirm as a matter of sworn testimony that
the minimization tactics are a “fairly common” practice and confirm the
influence of the Reid technique.101 Moreover, these cases offer a glimpse
into the actual minimizing words the interrogators use.
Consider murder cases. In Minnesota, Kelly Ritt was accused of
purposely starting a fire to kill her twenty-three month old, special needs
daughter (but not her other three children, who survived).102 The detective
who interrogated Ritt energetically used the tactic when “he confided that
he too had a disabled child whose care was very demanding, that often he
wished he ‘could throw’ his son out the window, that sometimes he wanted
to see the child die rather than suffer, and that his own wife ‘could have
intentionally done this’ too.”103 In a Massachusetts case, the detectives
offered to a murder suspect “reasons why he might have killed the victim
[his mother] without being ‘a bad guy,’ including . . . the possibility that he
had been provoked by mistreatment from his mother or his aunt.”104 “The
officers acknowledged at trial that they had been trained in techniques
known as ‘minimization.’”105 In a recent Illinois case, “detectives used
minimization tactics and attempted to diminish the legal seriousness and
moral seriousness of” the defendant’s killing by remarking “that they, too,
would remember and seek vengeance on someone [like the victim,

2010), all discussed infra note 121 and accompanying text. But those cases involved many traditional circumstances
supporting involuntariness and we find no similar cases elsewhere.
Appellate courts typically avoid describing moral minimization even when it is present. See, e.g., Schumaker
v. Kirkpatrick, 808 F. App'x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2020) (describing the defendant’s claim that interrogators used
“minimization[]” though without details). Even in a case finding that false promises of leniency rendered a
confession involuntary and inadmissible, the court noted that the trial judge stated that the police interrogation
techniques had “includ[ed] minimization of the crime,” but “did not specifically describe the ‘interrogation
techniques’ used.” State v. Hunt, 151 A.3d 911, 915 & n.1 (Me. 2016).
101
In an Ohio case involving sexual misconduct with a minor, the detective agreed that his effort to “minimize
the extent of the crime” is a “fairly common police tactic.” State v. Fouts, 2016-Ohio-1104, 2016 WL 1071457, at
*8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016). See also United States v. Woody, No. CR-13-08093-001-PCT, 2015 WL 1530552,
at 10 (D. Ariz. Apr. 6, 2015), rev'd, 652 F. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that an FBI agent “has received training
in the Reid technique” and the agent “acknowledged that he generally employs minimization”).
102
See State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802 (1999).
103
See Coughlin, supra note 17 at 1649 (citing transcripts). Confirming that the appellate courts have no
doctrinal reason to describe moral minimization when it occurs, the appellate opinion upholding Ritt’s conviction
for murder does not mention these astonishing facts, even though the interrogation was a major issue for the appeal.
See State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802 (1999). See also United States v. Hunter, 912 F. Supp.2d 388, 393 (E.D. Va.
2012) (describing the detective in a child-murder case as telling suspect that “every parent had been in the
defendant’s position and that no one would ‘fault’ her”).
104
Commonwealth v. Cartright, 84 N.E.3d 851, 857 (2017).
105
Id.
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purportedly] who murdered their brother.”106 Several other judicial opinions
in murder cases turn up examples of moral minimization.107
The police minimize the seriousness of sexual assault. In an Idaho
case, police suspected the adult defendant of inappropriately touching a
fifteen-year-old foster child at his residence, which would constitute a crime
punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.108 Yet the detective “repeatedly
and substantially downplayed the serious of the allegations,”109 saying: “So
[the girl] has made a few statements about some pretty minor issues, in the
big scheme of things. . . . This case is (inaudible) not even a blip on the
radar hardly because it’s not really major allegations. . . . [E]ven if those
things are true, they are just minor issues,” which might be handled that
same day, as by an apology letter.110 Later the detective said that the
accusations were “not the end of the world,” and that the greater crime
would be lying to the police.111 Several other reported sexual assault
interrogations have used a similar approach,112 especially when the suspect
is a juvenile.113
106

People v. Jones, No. 1-17-1623, 2021 WL 1227837, *13 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 31, 2021).
See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 335 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“The
investigators in this case employed classic minimization techniques by” blaming confederate); State v. Stone, 303
P.3d 636, 642 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (interrogator stated “[T]his is not the crime of the century” and that being “a
liar” is worse “by far”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 11 N.E.3d 95, 103 n.6 (Mass. 2014) (interrogators stated “that
people get passionate . . . and ‘snap everyday of their lives’”); Dock v. State, No. 02-18-00462-CR, 2019 WL
6205248, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019) (“detectives’ interrogation followed [the] approach” of interrogation
manuals “to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense and to cast blame on the victim and society”).
108
State v. Valero, 285 P.3d 1014, 1015-16, 1018 (Idaho Ct. App.2012).
109
Id. at 1017.
110
Id. at 1017-19 (“[These allegations] are not like some major issue that you and I can’t get resolved today.”).
111
Id. at 1018-19.
112
See State v. Chavez-Meza, 456 P.3d 322, 326 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (reporting that in a rape case involving
a twelve-year-old victim, the detectives stated: “Like, we can deal with mistakes. People make mistakes all the time,
and you still live your life.”); People v. Morales-Cuevas, 2018 WL 4501114, *9-10 (Ct. App. Cal. 2018)
(interrogator used “minimization” techniques regarding defendant’s sexual assaults on stepdaughter beginning when
she was nine years old); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d 1229, 1241-42 (Kan. 2010) (interrogators minimized crime with
nine-year old victim by stating: “I mean, she's not saying that you had sex with her but that you just had her, just
basically just jack you off. And that's, you know, that's not a big deal.”).
113
In a California case, In re Elias V, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 202, 215-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), the court described
how the detective, interrogating a 13-year old boy, employed “minimization” by offering him two “understandable”
explanations for the sexual touching of a three-year old: “natural ‘curiosity,’” or “that the act was one any normal
person in his shoes would find ‘exciting.’” Id. at 216. See also Commonwealth v. Bell, 365 S.W.3d 216, 219-220
(Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (interrogating detective said to the thirteen year old suspect of sexual assault of six-year old
cousin “that thirteen-year-old boys ‘have a lot of hormones,’” and that “you did it because you were horny, had a
hard on, and you were curious.”); In re A.W., No. A-0244-09T2, 2011 WL 386999, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 3, 2011), aff'd sub nom. State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793 (N.J. 2012) (interrogator provided juvenile suspect of
the sexual assault of a child the excuse of “experimentation”); In re Welfare of J. M. B., No. C5-00-144, 2000 WL
890401, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2000) (noting that the “detective told J.M.B. that if any sexual contact
occurred, it was not a big deal, it was “normal experience stuff,” during interrogation of juvenile for the sexual
abuse of a three-year old).
107
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Rhode Island state police used similar tactics in a child pornography
case, where the detective stated that “downloading of child pornography
was ‘not the end of the world’ . . . [and] that things can be thought of as ‘a
spectrum, with the monster at one side ... good old American porn [on the
other end] ... [a]nd then right next to that, is like the stuff you're looking at,
inappropriate CP, we call it, Child Porn.’114 The Court found these
statements were “clearly based on the Reid Technique”115
The sexual assault cases also illustrate the tactic of redirecting blame
to other factors, such as alcohol and genetics, and of blaming the victim.
From a recent sexual assault case from Hawaii, where the victims were
minors, here a sample of the detective’s monologue:
[Y]ou just made an error in judgment. . . . You were just not
in the right frame of mind . . . Alcohol is . . . where people
get themselves into trouble, cause they lose their
inhibitions[.] . . . Women are a lot more promiscuous, you
know. . . Everybody fucks up in life, okay . . . [O]ur brains
are programmed a certain way . . . . Guys are programmed to
procreate. . . . We all get busted. This is how our brains are
wired. . . You just drank too much, dude. You drank too
much. You smoked too much. Bad error in judgment.116
Minimization of statutory rape crimes includes the ideas that
children can initiate and consent to sex and that some minors are
particularly mature and attractive. In one California sexual assault case,
where the victim was under the age of 14, the detective told the suspect:
[T]his is not all your fault. . . . I've seen this young lady. I
know she's very attractive. . . . And she probably had some
curiosities and she may have been interested in you in that
way. . . . And I can understand how you could be attracted to
her because she probably came on to you, okay.117
114

United States v. Monroe, 264 F.Supp.3d 376, 391 n.143 (D.R.I. 2017).
Id.
116
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (Haw. 2020).
117
People v. Aguirre, No. H041415, 2016 WL 3679901, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 6, 2016).
115
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In another California case, the adult male defendant was convicted of sexual
assault crimes involving a girl A.C. whom he began molesting when she
was ten years old and with whom he had anal sex when she was thirteen
years old.118 The interrogating detectives suggested to Gomez that
A.C. was mature for her age, was fully developed with large
breasts, and probably ‘came on’ to defendant. . . . [Detective]
Skrinde said he and [Detective] Garcia were starting to
wonder if it was more A.C. than defendant, suggesting A.C.
was a beautiful, fully developed woman who may have been
attracted to defendant . . . Skrinde said to defendant, ‘You're
a man. And that I get. It's happened to me.’119
Other cases use the same minimizations along with alcohol consumption to
rationalize underage sex crimes.120
Minimization shows up for other crimes, especially in
Massachusetts. No state holds that moral minimization alone can render a
confession involuntary, but Massachusetts is one of the few American
jurisdictions to recognize that minimization is a relevant factor within the
“totality of circumstances” that determines the voluntariness, and thus
admissibility, of a confession.121 That legal stance explains why there are
more cases from this state – defense lawyers have at least a weak reason to

118

Gomez, supra note 47, at *1-2.

119

Id. at *11 (emphasis added). See also Couglin, supra note 17 (explaining how later editions of INBAU,
ET AL, deleted the suggestion from earlier editions that the detective minimize a sex crime by claiming to
have committed a similar one in his youth).
120
See People v. Cortez, 2016 WL 6962539, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016) (interrogator “referenced”
the “physical appearance and conduct” of the victim, under age 14, and “suggested she was also guilty.”); State v.
Chavez-Meza, 456 P.3d 322, 324, 327 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (interrogator said of twelve year old victim, “I believe
that it was probably consensual, she wanted to have set with you”); State v. Fernandez-Torres, 337 P.3d 691, 695
(Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (interrogator excused inappropriately touching a seven-year old girl because suspect “had
too much to drink,” and “it's ok because you didn't keep on touching her.”); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, No.
2009-00639, 2011 WL 649942, at *7 (Mass. Super. Feb. 14, 2011) (offering the suspect in the sexual assault of
two children the excuse: “[W]e know it's not you it's the booze”).
121
See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 525 (2004). The court has not found that moral
minimization alone could render a confession involuntary. See also State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 873 (Haw. 2020)
(finding that moral minimization statements and gender-based stereotypes were two of seven factors that made the
defendant’s confession involuntary); State v. Stone, 237 P.3d 1229, 1241-42 (Kan. 2010) (finding that minimizing
sexual assault of a nine-year old as “not a big deal” and not really “sex” was one factor of many in finding confession
involuntary). The voluntariness test is grounded in the due process clause. See Hagen & Nissman, supra note 14.
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litigate moral minimizations. In one Massachusetts robbery case, detectives
offered the defendant reasons for why he may have committed the alleged
robberies, such as needing money to buy food for himself and his infant
daughter.122 A Massachusetts arson case describes a detective’s
minimization in “an hour-long near monologue,” comparing “his view of
the defendant's conduct to the sort of mischief, pranking and “tomfoolery”
that could take place on ‘cabbage night,’” referring to “the night before
Halloween,” and also offering alcohol as an excuse.123
In another Massachusetts arson case, the court recognized the
“standard interrogation tactic of ‘minimization’” and its origin in the
Inbau/Reid interrogation manual.124 The defendant had a dispute with his
landlord over the latter’s failure to make repairs to the apartment, which
presented an opportunity to blame the victim.125 According to the court, the
trooper “downplay[ed] the crime itself” “by pointing out that . . . in light of
the deplorable condition of the premises, the trooper could ‘relate to’ and
‘understand’ his anger at the landlord and the desire to ‘do something like
that.’”126
In sum, law enforcement surveys, direct observations, and judicial
opinions all make clear that American police frequently employ the
interrogation tactic of moral minimization.
D. A Very Rough Estimate of the Frequency of Moral Minimizations
One might ask how frequently? Here, we calculate a “back of the
envelope” estimate for the number of moral minimizations in the United
States in one year. In 2019, state and local law enforcement made over ten
million arrests in the United States.127 If we narrow our focus to likely
122
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 35 N.E.3d 677, 686 (2015). See also Commonwealth. v. Quint Q., 84 Mass.
App. Ct. 507, 511 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (interrogator of a 15-year old suspected of breaking and entering said:
“maybe what you did . . . [was] a momentary lapse of judgment; you made a mistake”).
123
Commonwealth v. Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Mass. 2012).
124
Id. at 527.
125
Id. at 519.
126
Id. at 520.
127
Criminal Justice Information Services Division, FBI, 2019 Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR (last
visited Jan. 21, 2022), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/personsarrested (estimating 2019 arrests at 10,085,207).
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felonies of the sort discussed above, then the relevant subset contains 1.5
million arrests for violent and property crimes.128 The violent crimes are
murder, non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; the
property crimes are burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson.129 FBI Uniform Crime Reports do not separate felony and
misdemeanor arrests, but these crimes are nearly always classified as
felonies. The number is a conservative estimate considering we are leaving
out arrests for non-aggravated assaults and other relevant crimes that are
sometimes felonies (and also because the police sometimes interrogate
suspects they have not arrested and never arrest). The limited available
evidence suggests that, post-Miranda, police manage to interrogate arrestees
in about 80% of felonies.130 This figure implies that police manage to
deploy some interrogation tactics on about 1.2 million felony suspects per
year.
Using the Leo observations from before, under which the
conservative estimate is that police use the tactic in one-third of
interrogations, we arrive at an estimated 400,000 times a year that police
detectives minimize the moral seriousness of the suspected offense and/or
shift moral blame away from the suspect. One could work to make the
estimates better at each stage, but the exact number is not of great concern
for our purposes. The phenomenon would be significant even if it we were
overestimating it by an order of magnitude.
We also note a final reason to think the number 400,000 understates
the significance of the practice. There is no perfect acoustic separation131
between the interrogation room and the rest of the world. Suspects no doubt
recount what the police said to them to others. Although some of those who
receive these reports from interrogated suspects might not believe them,

128

Id. (estimating 495,871 violent crime arrests and 1,074,367 property crime arrests).
Id. at Table 29, n.3.
130
See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects
of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 854, 869 (1996) (reporting on a sample of 219 felony arrestees in Salt Lake
City in which police failed to question 21% of felony suspects); FLOYD FEENEY, ET AL., ARRESTS WITHOUT
CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY 13 (1983) (table 15-2) (reporting that police failed to question
18.5% of burglary arrestees in Jacksonville, Florida and 20.1% of burglary arrestees in San Diego); Richard A. Leo,
The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOL. 621, 654 (1998) (finding that 78% of a suspects in a
sample waive their Miranda rights).
131
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
LAW REV. 625 (1984).
129
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others no doubt do. If interrogated suspects credibly conveyed the
interrogator’s statements to a little more than, one average, one close friend
or relative, then our best guess is that more than a million Americans
receive a message each year that law enforcement authorities regard some
serious crime as trivial and/or that society or the victim is to blame. As
indicated, this remains a very rough guess.
II. THE CRIMINOGENIC RISKS OF MORAL MINIMIZATION
We have just roughly estimated that police reach a million people a
year – some only indirectly – with a message of moral minimization. If an
American state or local government reached a fraction as many people with
public service announcements proposing that citizens generally not take
personal responsibility for their felonies, it would, so to speak, create
concern. The purported difference, of course, is that the moral minimization
tactics may make possible criminal convictions that would not otherwise
occur, whereas the public service announcement would serve no such end.
Proponents of the minimization tactic argue that it is necessary to produce
confessions, solve crimes, and thereby secure convictions that might not
otherwise be secured.
That is the tactic’s purported benefit. Yet a full assessment of
minimization must also reckon its costs, or, if the costs are uncertain, its
risks.132 In this Part, we explore one set of risks, the tendency of moral
minimization to encourage crime. The government’s persistent effort to
trivialize crime and cast blame away from the offender undermines multiple
mechanisms of legal compliance. As context for the assessment, however,
consider one simple point about the purported benefit of moral
minimization: its uncertainty. We do not know if or how much the tactic
works.
Presumably, the right way to evaluate an interrogation method or
tactic is to consider the sum of its unique effects on true and false
confessions (“confessions” here serving as a shorthand for any
132
The interrogation literature already discusses the relationship between interrogation tactics and false
confessions. See supra note 16. That risk is less about moral minimization than legal minimization, because the
implication of the latter is a promise of leniency.
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incriminating statement). But we do not have serious evidence for the
unique contributions of confrontational interrogation methods, such as the
Reid technique. At one point, the Reid manual claims that “[t]he most
experienced and skilled investigators achieve a confession rate of only
about 80%.”133 Aside from the circularity of deciding who is the most
“skilled” by their overall confession rate, and the absence of a genuine
effort to identify the false confession rate, there is no comparison here
between the accusatory method used in the United States and Canada and
its alternatives in the United Kingdom, Australia, and other places.134 We
lack a baseline measure for the success of interrogations using nonaccusatory methods or even the improvisations of an untrained investigator.
To our knowledge, there is no rich field data to allow such a comparison
between real world interrogators who use different methods, much less do
we have a randomized trial comparing different methods.135 Experimental
results tentatively suggest that the information-gathering method is superior
to accusatory methods.136
Even if we did know that the Reid technique or other accusatory
methods of interrogation were more effective than the alternatives at
inducing true confessions and avoiding false ones, there is no evidence that
the particular tactic of moral minimization is important to the success of the
overall technique. There are no randomized trials of different interrogation
techniques, nor rich data allowing comparison of interrogators using the
Reid techniques to those using all the techniques except moral
minimization. What does exist is some observational data and a small
number of relevant experiments. Neither provide a sound basis for inferring
that moral minimizations uniquely causes more true confessions than false

133

INBAU ET AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION, supra note 1, at 302.
See Meissner et al., supra note 18, at 216.
135
See, e.g., Peter Kageleiry, Jr., Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the
Interrogation Room Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2007).
136
See Christian A. Meissner, et al., Accusatorial and Information-Gathering Interrogation Methods and Their
Effects on True and False Confessions: a Meta-Analytic Review, 10 J. EXP. CRIMINOL. 459, 460 (2014) (finding
field studies lack the ability to measure false confessions, but twelve experiments suggest the superior diagnosticity
of information-gathering over accusatory methods). See also Jacqueline R. Evans, et al., Obtaining Guilty
Knowledge in Human Intelligence Interrogations: Comparing Accusatorial and Information-Gathering
Approaches with a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 2 J. APPLIED RSCH. MEMORY & COGNITION 83, 86-87 (2013)
(reporting experimental results showing the superiority of information-gathering over accusatory methods in an
intelligence setting).
134
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ones.137 In sum, the effectiveness of moral minimization is not empirically
established.
To be clear, we find the causal case for moral minimization as an
interrogation tactic plausible. A guilty suspect might be hesitant to admit
guilt in part because of the expected negative judgment of family, friends,
acquaintances, and even strangers. When detectives minimize the moral
wrongfulness of a crime, they make it appear, at a minimum, that the
detectives will be less judgmental of the confessed perpetrator. The
detectives’ attitude also implies that the broader society will be less
disapproving of the confessed perpetrator. These implications reduce the

137
Leo’s observations showed significantly higher confession rates in interrogations with certain moral
minimizations than without. Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 91, at 294 (reporting in Table 14 the success rate
with the tactic of “moral justifications/psychological excuses”); id at 295-96 (reporting in Table 15 the success of
“offer[ing] moral rationalizations”). In each case, the chi-squared test showed significance at the level of p < .05.
Id. Leo does not assert that this correlation shows the success of the technique, but one paper later cited Leo as
evidence that the tactic is “highly effective.” Copes, et al., supra note 39, at 448, 450.
There are two problems here. First, Leo had no way to discern whether confessions were true or false,
and therefore no way to judge the tactic a net success. Nor did he compare the accusatory style of interrogation with
a competitor, such as information-gathering or the improvisations of an untrained interrogator. Second, one cannot
make reliable causal inferences from the data because Leo was not controlling for a host of relevant variables, such
as the experience of the detective or length of the interrogation. Among possible confounds, Leo, Interrogation
Room, supra note 91, at 297, reports that longer interrogations are more successful, and that police had longer
interrogations when the victim was female, id., which is precisely when we might expect police to be more likely
to minimize by blaming the victim. If so, it could be that the tactic’s correlation with confessions is due to
interrogation length rather than the moral minimization that is merely correlated with length.
A recent interrogation study measures a variable Leo lacks – the frequency by which detectives use
techniques in actual interrogations, as well as temporally connected self-incriminating statements. The results are
mixed, finding that offering moral rationalizations was not significantly associated with admissions, but
rationalizations do significantly increase crying by the suspect, which significantly increases the odds of a suspect
admission. Kelly, et al., supra, note 94, at 173 (reporting on results from 45 hours of 29 felony interrogations by
Los Angeles Police Department detectives). The experimenters had some reason to think that all the suspects were
guilty, but could not be certain, which means the study offers no way to assess how the tactic affected the false
confession rate.
Several experiments cast doubt on the net effectiveness of minimization. The experimental design
involves the interrogation of participants who have actually violated some rules of the experiment. See, e.g., Melissa
B. Russano, et al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCH.
SCI. 481 (2005). Although the researcher-interrogator is blind as to whether a rule-violation had occurred, other
researchers were aware. Thus, the experiment allowed measurement of true and false confessions and true and false
non-confessions, in response to changes in interrogation tactics. Moral minimization increased confessions among
the guilty, but increased confessions by the innocent to a greater extent. Thus, minimization lowered the overall
diagnosticity of the interrogation. See id. at 484 (table 1). Reaching similar results, see Jessica R. Klaver, et al.,
Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm,
13 LEGAL & CRIMINOL. PSYCH. 71 (2008); Fadia M. Narchet, et al., Modeling the Influence of Investigator Bias on
the Elicitation of True and False Confessions, 35 L. HUM. BEHAV. 452 (2011); Allyson J. Horgan, et al.,
Minimization and Maximization Techniques: Assessing the Perceived Consequences of Confessing and Confession
Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCH. CRIME & L. 65 (2012).
Experiments that do not involve actual criminality nor real detectives raise obvious external validity
concerns. There is also the possibility that false confessions in the real world might be identified as such before trial,
so they matter less for assessing ultimate diagnosticity. See Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and
Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues,
97 B.U. LAW REV. 1157, 1163-64 (2017). Because of these uncertainties, our claim is merely that the effectiveness
of moral minimization remains plausible but empirically unproven.
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expected shame from confessing, rendering a confession more likely. Our
point, however, is that the case for minimization rests entirely at this level
of plausibility, not on empiricism.
The costs of moral minimization that we explore stand on similar
footing – not empirically validated, but plausible. Indeed, these costs are
necessarily as plausible as the claim that the interrogation tactic induces
true confessions because, as we will show, the same psychological process
– neutralization – that arguably leads to confessions also makes it more
likely that the interrogated suspect will offend in the future. We also
identify mechanisms other than neutralization – social norms and legal
legitimacy – that link moral minimization to increased crime. In that sense,
our criminogenic claim is more plausible than the effectiveness of moral
minimization because the latter strictly depends on neutralization theory
while the former does not.
This Part develops our claim in three sections. Section A explores
the five law and/or social science literatures that reveal the criminogenic
risks of moral minimization: the psychological theory of neutralization
(upon which the Reid manual relies), research on restorative justice, the
doctrine of the entrapment defense, the connection between informal social
norms and law’s expressive effects, and research on legal legitimacy.
Section B synthesizes the argument by identifying particular crimes and
particular defendants for which the criminogenic claim is most -- and least - powerful. Section C defends the claim against an objection to our thesis,
the idea that criminal prosecution, conviction, and punishment contain
enough expressive condemnation of the perpetrator’s crime to undo all the
damage of moral minimization.
A. The Risks of Minimizing Internal Motives for Compliance
1. The Implications of Neutralization Theory
Moral minimization statements are “a persuasive effort on the part
of the investigator to reinforce those existing excuses or rationalizations
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within the guilty suspect’s mind.”138 The manual emphasizes that the goal is
to discover and reinforce the same neutralizations as actually motivated the
suspect to commit the crime.139 The theme is presented initially in a
monologue and extended throughout the interrogation. The topic is
important enough to justify extensive treatment in the Reid manuals, even
one supplemental manual devoted entirely to the topic.140 One might
reasonably ask: Why? Why does reinforcing the suspect’s anti-social
reasoning help the detective elicit a true confession? The answer is
important because it points the way to the unexpected consequences of the
tactic.
To justify minimization, the Reid manual points to the psychological
theory of neutralization, initially proposed in the 1950s.141 Neutralization is
not an all-purpose theory of crime, but a resolution of a particular puzzle
that arises for some people and some crimes. The puzzle is how people who
have internalized a norm against certain criminal conduct, as against
stealing or violence, can nonetheless engage in the conduct. Or, to put it
differently, should we always disbelieve those who intentionally commit a
crime when they subsequently claim to feel remorse and suffer guilt? On a
simplistic account, those who have internalized the norm against the
criminal act of violence or theft would not commit such crimes, so those
who commit those crimes show themselves not to have internalized the
norms. Their expressed remorse cannot be genuine.
The better view, however, is that those who internalize the norm can
still intentionally violate it, and then feel genuine guilt and remorse. One
possibility is that the internal motive for avoiding crime usually leads to
legal compliance, but in some instances the expected benefit from the crime
is so high as to overcome the expected feeling of guilt. Another explanation,
complimentary to the first, is that the individuals managed to neutralize
138

INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 210.
See id. at 207 (“If the investigator’s suggested moral or psychological justifications are not already present
in the suspect’s mind, the suspect will often reject the implications of the theme.”); id. at 202 (noting that the
detective aims to “reinforce the guilty suspect’s own rationalizations and justifications for committing the crime”)
(emphasis added); Jayne & Buckley, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 276 (recommending that the interrogator
“reinforce the defense mechanisms that already exist in the suspect’s mind.”). The main alternative to the Reid
Technique suggests the same. See ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 308 (“The motive behind the
incident will often lead the interrogator to the proper rationalization.”).
140
See SENESE, supra note 28 (“Anatomy of Interrogation Themes”).
141
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 325-26, nn.7 & 15. See also infra note 144.
139
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their internal commitments. Consider this recent account of neutralization,
which focuses on the delinquency of minors:
When people are committed to a particular value system,
they typically experience guilt or shame for violating, or
even contemplating violating, its norms. This guilt, and its
potential for producing a negative self-image, dissuades most
people from engaging in crime or delinquency. Therefore, to
participate in delinquent behavior under such conditions,
youths must find ways to neutralize the guilt associated with
their actions. They do this by relying on patterned thoughts
and beliefs that blunt the moral force of the law and
neutralize the guilt of criminal participation. . . . allowing
individuals to engage freely in delinquency without serious
damage to their self-image.142
Neutralization theory thus explains one necessary causal step for a certain
group of people – those who have internalized social norms some criminal
provisions enforce – to violate those particular criminal provisions.
Stated more briefly: The criminal “distorts what was done and the
motives for doing it until the behavior is consistent with self-concept.”143
The primary Reid manual quotes this explanation of neutralization theory
by psychologist Michael Lillyquist as part of its general effort to explain
why moral minimization works to elicit confessions.144 The idea is that the
suspect expects to experience psychological costs, e.g., anxiety and shame,
from confessing. Moral minimization lowers those costs. First, the tactic
demonstrates that the detectives themselves will not make critical
judgments of the suspect. As noted in a psychological appendix to the third
142
Robert G. Morris & Heith Copes, Exploring the Temporal Dynamics of the Neutralization/ Delinquency
Relationship, 37 CRIM JUST. REV. 442, 443 (2012).
143
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 326, n.15 (quoting. LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 152.
144
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 325-26, n.7 (citing LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 153-60 and Copes, et
al., supra note 39. The third edition of the manual, INBAU ET AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
327-47 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter, INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION] contained an Appendix titled “The Psychological
Principles of Criminal Interrogation,” written by Brian C. Jayne. That appendix, Id. at 340-41 nn.1 & 2, also explains
how offenders rationalize their crimes by citing Lillyquist, as well as the seminal article on neutralization, Gresham
M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOCIO. REV. 664, 66769 (1957).
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edition of the primary manual: “The mere embarrassment of having to
admit an act of wrongdoing can pose a formidable barrier to overcome
during an interrogation.”145 Second, the suspect makes inferences from the
detectives’ minimizations. “[I]f the suspect who is concerned about
avoiding personal consequences believes that the interrogator can
understand and seem to forgive the offense or suspect, he may believe that
others will also be sympathetic and forgiving.”146
Yet the cited pages of the Lillyquist book are a clear warning to
those who would minimize crimes or criminal responsibility. Neutralization
theory implies that the easier it is for an individual to neutralize the moral
objections to a crime, the easier it is for the individual to commit the crime.
Although there are many causes of crime, Lillyquist states (on the same
page from which the Reid manual quotes): “It is often the case that the
words which a person offers after an event, as a rationalization, were
available to the person before the event, and, furthermore, that were they
not available, the person may not have committed an action inconsistent
with his or her self-concept.”147 Lillyquist also quotes the sociologist C.
Wright Mills: “Often anticipation of acceptable justifications will control
conduct. (‘If I did this, what could I say? What would they say?’) Decisions
may be, wholly or in part, delimited by answers to such queries.”148 In other
word, the claim being made on the very pages the Reid manual cites, is that,
at the margin, neutralizations cause crime. The causal claim is made
throughout the cited chapter.149

145
INBAU, ET. AL, THIRD EDITION, supra note 144, at 328 (from the appendix titled “The Psychological
Principles of Criminal Interrogation,” by Brian C. Jayne).
146
Id. at 341. By “personal consequences,” the psychological appendix refers to effects on the “individual’s
self-concept,” such as “loss of self-esteem, pride, or integrity.” Id. at 328. See also Id. at 343 (“[t]he interrogator
must be careful in his condemnations; the suspect should experience anxiety not because of the crime committed,
but rather because he is lying about it.”).
147
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 152-53 (emphasis in original).
148
Id. (quoting C. WRIGHT MILLS, POWER, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 443 (1963)).
149
See LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 160, where Lillyquist asks and answers the causal question: “Are the
neutralizations 'mere' rationalizations or do they operate before the offense and facilitate it? . . . [T]he theorists who
use the term neutralization intend it to be viewed as a pre-offense activity, not just an excuse mustered after being
caught.” He quotes a trio of sociologists for the proposition that neutralizations are “not merely ex post facto excuses
or rationalizations invented for the authorities' ears, but rather phrases which actually facilitate or motivate the
commission of deviant actions by neutralizing a preexisting normative constraint.” See id. (citing IAN TAYLOR,
PAUL WALTON & JOCK YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE 176 (1973)).
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As should now be apparent, there is no difference between what the
Reid manuals call “theme-development,” what we call “moral
minimization,” and what this psychological literature calls “neutralization.”
On pages cited by the Reid manual, Lillyquist lists the classic “techniques
of neutralization” (taken from the seminal article on the subject150): (1)
denial of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3) denial of victim, (4)
condemnation of the condemnors, and (5) appeal to higher loyalties.”151 As
the manual indicates, these five neutralization techniques supply the Reid
themes of moral minimizations.
The first category, “Denial of responsibility” includes claims of
ignorance because one was “intoxicated with liquor or drugs,”152 which, as
we saw, is a common tool of moral minimization in interrogations.153 It also
includes “tak[ing] the approach of the extreme environmental attributionist
who sees all actions as completely determined by situational factors.”154
Interrogators use this technique when they blame society or an emotional
state.155 Recall the sexual assault case in which the interrogator had offered
that the suspect acted when he was “not in the right frame of mind.”156
“Denial of injury” involves adopting a narrow view of harm and
describing some criminal acts as mere “mischief” or “pranks.”157 We saw
this narrowing in child sexual abuse cases where the detectives suggested
that minors could and did consent to sex, and in a Massachusetts case
comparing arson to “cabbage night” pranks.158 “Denial of victim” includes
the idea that “they had it coming,” which “holds the injured parties

150
Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 667-69. See also W. William Minor, Techniques of Neutralization: A
Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination, 18 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 295 (1981).
151
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 153 (citing Sykes & Matza, supra note 144. See id. at 667 (“It is by learning
these techniques [of neutralization] that the juvenile becomes delinquent.”). Neutralization theory is “no longer
confined to the study of juvenile delinquents,” but is applied to a wide variety of adult criminal behaviors. See Shadd
Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, 32 CRIME & JUST.
221, 223 (2005).
152
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 153.
153
See supra notes 55, 68, 116, 125, 128, 140 and accompanying text.
154
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 153. See also Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 667 (“In effect, the
delinquent approaches a ‘billiard ball’ conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into
new situations.”).
155
See supra notes 21-23, 123, and accompanying text.
156
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (2020).
157
See Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 667-68. See also LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 154.
158
See supra note 126-32, 137, and accompanying text.
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responsible for their own injuries.”159 We saw many such victim-blaming
techniques. One example Lillyquist gives is a thief blaming the wealthy
victim as have acquired their wealth dishonestly,160 which fits perfectly with
a victim-blaming theme.
The neutralization technique of “condemning the condemnor” posits
that everyone commits similar crimes or is corrupt, so the prosecution is
hypocritical.161 The Reid method specifically proposes to tell those
suspected of stealing from their employer how surprisingly common such
crime is, and to blame the government for “squeez[ing] citizens with
burdensome taxes . . . to waste on foreign countries.”162 Finally, the “higher
loyalties” technique justifies the crime as serving values more important
than law, such as the protection and welfare of one’s family or friends.163
Several Reid minimization themes involve proposing that the suspect acted
on behalf of his family.164
Given the overlap, our claim is simple. First, there is a theory that
proposes that people who have internalized social norms against criminal
acts are able to talk themselves into committing such acts only if they
succeed at “neutralization.” Second, there is an interrogation technique that
explicitly seeks to reinforce the suspect’s precise neutralizations. Thus, to
secure a confession for a past crime, moral minimization endorses and
encourages the very psychological processes that the referenced theory says
will lead to future crime. The technique is not a fleeting moment of the
interrogation, but a persistent theme requiring an extended monologue. And
the theme is memorable and powerful because it is presented with apparent
empathy by police officers from whom the suspect expected only
disapproval.
To illustrate, we offer a psychological account of a hypothetical case
using “Joe,” the prototypical offender named in the manual’s interrogation
scripts. Joe stole from his employer. Before embezzling funds, he
159
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 154. See Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 668 (“The injury . . . is a form
of rightful retaliation or punishment”).
160
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 154.
161
Id. at 156; Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 668.
162
INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 230.
163
LILLYQUIST, supra note 39, at 156-57; Sykes & Matza, supra note 144, at 669.
164
See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
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rationalized away the social norms that would otherwise constrain him,
wanting to preserve his identity as a “good person” who is not a “thief,”
despite this anticipated crime. Joe initially succeeded at this rationalization
by telling himself that he is the true victim of his employer, who underpays
him (denial of victim); that the corporate employer is not really harmed by
the amount he takes (denial of injury); and that his duty as a parent and
spouse requires that he do what he must to provide for his family (higher
loyalties). “Anyone” in his circumstances, he reasoned, would take this
opportunity to supplement his meager wages by taking from his employer.
Yet the rationalization is tenuous. Joe realizes at some level that his
reasoning is self-serving and suspect.165 This would be true even if he had
secured some support for his neutralizations from friends or co-conspirators
because he knows that they are biased in his favor (or in their own favor)
and also not representative of how his broader community would view his
act of taking his employer’s money. While his salary is not as high as he
wishes, he worries that there is no real sense in which he is underpaid. (He
is paid more than some, paid more than he used to be, and was lucky in
some ways to have the job at all). If he lets himself think about the
aggregate amount of employee theft at his firm, he realizes that his
employer is seriously harmed by such theft. And he suspects that he will use
much of the money he takes on himself personally, not his family.
Now assume that Joe is arrested for theft. At this time, he is
particularly likely to think about these counter-considerations and “see
through” his neutralizations. When “caught,” he is forced to consider how
his community will reason about his behavior and worries that most people
will find the pro-responsibility reasons more compelling than the selfserving rationalizations. This is the moment when he is most likely to reject
his neutralizations, which would mean that he would find it difficult to rely
on them again in the future.
Except that American detectives step into this pivotal psychological
moment armed with the Reid technique. They surprise Joe not merely by
165
See INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 144, at 331 (noting that the defense mechanisms of
rationalization and projection “function through distorting or denying reality,” but “this does not mean that the
individual loses touch with reality; reality has merely been redefined.”).
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understanding all of his rationalizations, but by pre-emptively endorsing
them. Joe learns that, not merely close friends and family, but even
strangers support his rationalizations. Not merely unbiased strangers, but
law enforcement officials whom Joe had expected to be biased against him,
i.e., the most likely in his community to condemn a felony. And these
enforcers of the law do not blandly endorse his rationalizations, they do so
with apparent heartfelt emotion, looking him in the eye with a hand on his
shoulder.166 Over the time of the interrogation, Joe begins to think he was
right to begin with and wrong to doubt himself. Whatever the law may say,
community mores do not hold him to be a real thief. He actually is the
victim; his employer really didn’t suffer harm; and he in fact acted to fulfil
a higher duty to his family. Just like the detective said.
Which means he is now a greater risk for recidivism. If he ever
encounters another opportunity to steal from an employer, he will find it
much easier to neutralize the crime than the first time, and easier than would
have been the situation where the police offered no such reinforcement. But
even if he never encounters an opportunity to steal again from an employer,
the neutralizations generalize beyond that specific situation. Given an
opportunity, he is more likely to steal from any corporation or individual,
even one does not employ him, if their wealth might prevent them from
being seriously harmed by the theft (denial of harm). He is more likely to
steal from someone who wronged him in some way (denial of victim),
perhaps a neighbor or family member who refused a loan he needed and
thought he deserved. And he is more likely to steal in any circumstance
with the possibility of benefitting his family (higher loyalty).
One might resist the analysis by arguing that the police cannot
further corrupt guilty suspects, who have already successfully neutralized
the internalized aversion to committing criminal acts. This reply is flawed
in two ways.
First, those guilty of offending often retain some internal motivation
for complying with law. Recall that the whole point of neutralization theory
is to explain that the offender may experience genuine remorse and feelings
166

See id. at 346 (“Sympathy and expression abound from the interrogator’s voice.”).
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of guilt. Whether such an individual re-offends depends in part on whether
that linkage – between offending and negative emotions – is weakened or
strengthened by the experience of offending. Committing a long series of
offenses is likely to “harden” the perpetrator, who thereby loses the capacity
for feeling guilt or remorse for that type of offense (perhaps accompanied
by entry into a subculture that esteems that criminality).167 But a single
successful neutralization will usually fail to eliminate the linkage, which is
why the offender still struggles with guilt.
Indeed, the experience of being apprehended for an offense may
instead produce “softening.” As with Joe, being apprehended raises the
salience of all the arguments against one’s rationalizations. The
perpetrator’s experience of guilt or remorse may be greater than expected,
perhaps accompanied by the realization that the supporting rationalizations
are flimsy and unconvincing. Neutralization theory therefore applies as
much to the decision to re-offend as it does to the decision to offend for the
first time.168
Second, we should not forget that some of the suspects who listen to
interrogators minimize the crime and blame the victim are innocent. The
probable cause needed for an arrest is a low evidentiary bar, so police are
sometimes wrong in their suspicions of those they interrogate.169 In each
case, a person erroneously suspected of a sexual assault or theft is told by

167
See, e.g., Maruna & Copes, supra note 151, at 274 (suggesting that “in early stages of delinquency, youths
may need to use neutralizations to relieve the cognitive dissonance that occurs when their actions are not in line
with their values,” but “[b]y using these neutralizations, delinquents’ commitment to those conventional values are
eventually weakened to the point that there is no longer a need to neutralize”); William W. Minor, Neutralization
as a Hardening Process: Considerations in the Modeling of Change, 62 SOC. FORCES 995, 1018 (1984) (arguing
that “over time, either the desire or the moral disapproval should dissipate, leading one to either conformity or guiltfree deviance”).
168
Thus, even if, contrary to the claim of LILLYQUIST, supra note 39 and those he cites, neutralizations were
in the first instance after-the-fact rationalizations, they may still provide the “rationale or moral release mechanism
facilitating future offending.” Maruna & Copes, supra note 151, at 271, citing TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF
DELINQUENCY 208 (1969). See also RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 60
(3d ed. 1985) (as quoted in Maruna & Copes, supra note 151, at 271) (If “they successfully mitigate others’ or selfpunishment, they become discriminative for repetition of the deviant acts and, hence, precede the future commission
of the acts.”). On some accounts, neutralization “theory . . . is best understood as an explanation of persistence or
desistance rather than of onset of offending.” Maruna & Copes, supra note 151, at 271-27. See also Jennifer G.
McCarthy & Anna L. Stewart, Neutralization as a Process of Graduated Desensitisation: Moral Values of
Offenders,” 42 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOL. 278 (1998).
169
Recall our rough estimate that police use moral minimizations on 400,000 suspects per year, supra text
accompanying note 127-31. If only 20% were innocent, that would translate into 80,000 suspects. This seems like
a conservative estimate as detectives sometimes interrogate suspects they haven’t even arrested.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4044000

42

Etienne & McAdams

[Spring 2022]

detectives that the crimes are not serious and the victim or society is really
to blame. Aside from endorsing these neutralizations, the interrogation
conveys the meta-rationalization: “if the cops don’t think this is a big deal,
why should I?” Those who have not previously found it possible to
neutralize a sexual assault or theft may now do so.
The economic concept of marginality is helpful here.170 Moral
minimization works on marginal offenders, those who are still capable of
feeling guilty or shame from the offense. Away from the margin of
criminality are (1) infra-marginal non-offenders, law-abiding citizens
whose circumstances in life do not present them with sufficiently strong
temptations to overcome their internalized commitment not to offend, and
(2) infra-marginal offenders, the individuals who have not internalized the
social norm and will readily offend when the opportunity arises, without
guilt or shame.171 The logic of using moral minimization in interrogation
does not apply to either of these infra-marginal types. Non-offenders should
not confess and the infra-marginal offenders experience no guilt or shame
from which minimization offers relief.172 The logic of minimization,
therefore, applies only to the marginal offender. But these offenders are
precisely the ones who might be moved to re-offend or not depending on
whether their neutralizations for the crime are reinforced or diminished.
We call this last observation the “goose/gander” point. The Reid
argument for using moral minimization in interrogations is plausible only in
cases where neutralization theory is plausible. If a suspect possesses no
internal motivation for complying with law, there is no criminogenic risk to
offering moral minimizations, but there is also no plausible case for why
the minimizations would elicit a confession.

170
See, e.g., THOMAS J. MICELI, THE PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121-48 (2019).
171
These distinctions could all be made more complex and realistic, as positions on a continuum, but the basic
point would remain.
172
For example, those whose identity comes from a subculture that values a certain kind of criminality will
not be inclined to experience guilt or shame when committing those crimes and therefore have no need to rationalize
their behavior with their values. See, e.g., Volkan Topalli, The Seductive Nature of Autotelic Crime: How
Neutralization Theory Serves as a Boundary Condition for Understanding Hardcore Street Offending, 76 SOCIO.
INQUIRY 475 (2006).
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The goose/gander point is important for another objection. One
might resist our criminogenic claim by noting that the police currently lack
legitimacy for large parts of the American population173 and/or that the legal
estrangement of many Americans renders them immune to the influences
we describe.174 Although our argument would be strengthened for suspects
who view police as legitimate authority figures representing an inclusive
criminal justice system, it does not depend on that perception. Our claim
only depends on suspects expecting police disapproval and instead being
surprised by police endorsement of their neutralizations. From the
surprising fact that even the police minimize the moral seriousness of the
crime and blame others, one can confirm one’s neutralizations. But what if
suspects are so skeptical of the police that they do not believe anything the
detective says, including the minimizing statements? Then the goose/gander
point applies: if the suspect completely disbelieves the minimizations, there
is certainly no criminogenic risk, but also no reason whatsoever that the
minimizing tactic will elicit a confession.175
What do the Reid manuals offer in reply to the criminogenic claim
we raise? Almost nothing. With one exception, there is no indication that
the authors of the manuals realize that they could be helping suspects to
neutralize future crimes.176 The exception is a passage from (an early
edition of) a supplemental Reid manual focused solely on child abuse
interrogations, where David Buckley states:

173

See infra text accompanying notes 234-235.
See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of
Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 777, 778 (1998) (arguing that
“legal cynicism” “is a concept distinct from subcultural tolerance of deviance” and is found especially “in levels of
concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and immigrant concentrations”); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform
and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE LAW J. 2054, 2086-87 (2017) (“A person could
simultaneously see the police as a legitimate authority . . . and feel estranged from the police (believing that the
legal system and law enforcement . . . are fundamentally flawed and chaotic, and therefore send negative messages
about the group’s societal belonging.)”.
175
See INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 144, at 334 (noting the importance of the interrogator’s
credibility with the suspect to the success of interrogation).
176
In the psychological appendix that accompanied the third edition of the primary manual (1986), Jayne states
that the interrogator’s initial accusation – the statements of “direct positive confrontation” – will “abolish[]” the
neutralizations the offender had used up to that point. Id. at 345. But this confrontation occurs before the interrogator
offers themes of moral minimization, which “reintroduce[e]” the neutralizations. Id. Outside of the Reid manuals,
ZULAWSKI & WICKLANDER, supra note 33, at 341-42, has a section on “correcting the rationalizations,” but it is
concerned only with “correcting” the legal and not the moral minimizations the interrogators have used. The concern
is that rationalization might cause problems for the prosecution where it “remove[s] the intent necessary to prove a
violation of the law” (the only example given). Id. at 341. The manual does not suggest “correcting” the
interrogator’s efforts to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense nor by moral excuses and justifications.
174
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[I]n offering these themes the author is, in no way,
suggesting that a child is to blame for the abuse or that
emotions or alcohol decrease the legal consequences of
abusing a child. . . . [T]he goal of theme development is to
lower the offender’s perception of the seriousness of the
offense and to encourage him to tell the truth about his
offensive behavior. Having the offender take psychological
responsibility for his actions and acknowledge the trauma
and harms he caused his victims is beyond the scope of this
book and will need to be addressed by other professionals
subsequent to the offender’s acknowledgement of the abuse
in the victim.177
Notably, this is the only occasion we discovered in which a Reid manual
acknowledges the utter falsity of its recommended victim-blaming tactics.
The passage, however, is not reassuring. Buckley tacitly admits that
minimization works against the offender’s taking psychological
responsibility for the harm he has caused the victim. As feelings of guilt and
responsibility are correlated with lowering the risk of recidivism,178
Buckley acknowledges the need for subsequent work “by other
professionals” to convince the suspect not to believe the themes the
detectives sympathetically endorsed. No doubt, even more work is
necessary when detectives followed the Reid technique by reinforcing the
offender’s neutralizations. Also, some suspects never confess and are never
convicted, in which case there are no “other professionals” to even attempt
to undo the detective’s moral minimizations.

177
DAVID M. BUCKLEY, HOW TO IDENTIFY, INTERVIEW & INTERROGATE CHILD ABUSE OFFENDERS 274 (1st
ed. 2006) (emphasis added). The reference to “other professionals” does not appear in the substantially similar
passage of the second edition, BUCKLEY, supra note 28. That edition instead says “Expecting the offender to take
psychological responsibility . . . at this stage of the process is unrealistic and beyond the scope of this book.” Id. at
212.
178
See, e.g., June P. Tangney, et al., Two Faces of Shame: Understanding Shame and Guilt in the Prediction
of Jail Inmates’ Recidivism, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 799, 801 (2014) (“Inmates’ propensity to experience guilt, assessed
shortly upon incarceration, negatively predicted criminal recidivism during the first year post-release.”). See also
United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) (“A person who is conscious of having done
wrong, and who feels genuine remorse . . . is on the way to developing those internal checks that would keep many
people from committing crimes even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were lower than they are.”).
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Nor is there any reason to limit the concern to sex offenses against
children. If moral minimization works to elicit confessions for any crime, it
is because it works at lowering the guilt and shame the offender expected
from committing that crime. Weakening internal incentives to comply
undermines compliance. In short, if the tactic works as advertised, it is also
criminogenic.
2. Neutralization and the Lessons of Restorative Justice
As a possible objection to our criminogenic claim, one might
optimistically hope that the effects of moral minimization exist only in the
very short term. Perhaps the effect is sufficient to induce a true confession,
but then wears off within hours after the suspect signs a statement and
leaves the influence of the interrogating detectives.
There is nothing to support this optimistic account. In the quotation
above, Buckley does not suggest that the problem he identifies is solved by
the passage of time. To the contrary, criminal offenders often manage to
resist forever any feeling of personal responsibility for their crimes; they
may never empathize with their victims. One might think that the critical
moment for shattering the offender’s neutralizations would be in a
confrontation with police immediately after their apprehension, but that
when detectives instead use that moment to validate those neutralizations,
that they become all the more entrenched.
In any event, an important criminological literature examines the
long term effects of a brief intervention that is the mirror image of moral
minimization – that of restorative justice (“RJ”).179 According RJ theorists,
the ordinary process of criminal trials fails to meaningfully convey to the
offender the serious wrongfulness of their actions and the harm to the
victim.180 RJ theory says that to persuade the offender to take responsibility
requires face-to-face, emotional engagement during which others might
179
See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2017);
Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH LAW REV. 1.
180
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST.
1, 53 (1999) (noting that criminal defense lawyers “have a trained competence” in neutralization methods, such as
“condemning condemners, denying victim, denying injury, and denying responsibility”).
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critique the offender’s neutralizations of the crime. This engagement occurs
in RJ “conferences” that include victims, offenders, their families and
friends, and sometimes a convener (often a police officer) trained in
restorative justice techniques.181 Governments in different parts of the world
employ restorative justice conferences at different points in the criminal
process: as a diversionary program that avoids prosecution entirely; as a
step after a guilty plea and before formal sentencing; as a supplement to a
sentence of probation; or as a preparation for release from prison.182
John Braithwaite explicitly links the need for RJ to the problem of
neutralization, explaining: “Restorative justice conferences may prevent
crime by facilitating a drift back to law-supporting identities from lawneutralizing ones.”183 Braithwaite explains how offenders find it difficult to
sustain their neutralization techniques when confronted in a conference by
their victims, community members, and even members of their own
family.184 The idea is that engagement will push offenders to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their behavior and the flimsiness of their imagined excuses
and justifications, which makes it more difficult to neutralize the same kind
of crime in the future. If so, then efforts at restorative justice would
decrease recidivism.
The evidence from randomized controlled trials – the gold standard
in empirical testing – shows exactly this result. A recent meta-review
identified studies using a standard protocol for RJ conferences.185 The
review considered only those studies in which crime victims had consented
181
See Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice as Evidence-Based Sentencing, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 215, 216 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012)
(noting that an RJ conference “brings together offenders, their victims, and their respective kin and Communities”).
182
See Lawrence W. Sherman, Heather Strang, Evan Mayo-Wilson, Daniel J. Woods & Barak Ariel, Are
Restorative Justice Conferences Effective in Reducing Repeat Offending? Findings from a Campbell Systematic
Review, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOL. 1, 3 (2015); United Nations OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 13-31 (2006).
183
Braithwaite, supra note 180, at 47.
184
Id. at 47-53. With the victim present, “it is hard to sustain denial of victim and denial of injury.” Id. at 47.
“[V]ictim supporters will often move offenders through the communicative power, the authenticity that comes from
their love of the victim.” Id. Second, “[c]ondemnation of the condemnors is also more difficult to sustain when
one’s condemnors engage in a respectful dialogue about why the criminal behavior of concern to them is harmful.”
Id. “Conferences and healing circles are designed to make the condemners members of an in-group rather than an
outgroup by two moves: inviting participants from all the in-groups that matter most to offenders; encouraging
victims and victim supporters to be respectful.” Id. at 48.
185
See Lawrence W. Sherman, et al., Are Restorative Justice Conferences Effective in Reducing Repeat
Offending? Findings from a Campbell Systematic Review, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOL. 1 (2015).
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to participate in a randomized trial – into RJ or the non-RJ control – before
the random assignment occurred, and which measured recidivism rates for
at least two subsequent years.186 There were ten such studies involving a
total of 1,880 offenders who committed violent or property crimes over five
jurisdictions (and three continents). Nine of out ten studies showed lowered
recidivism for those selected for an RJ conference and this pattern across
the studies is statistically significant.187 The “average effect size is .155
standard deviations less repeat offending among the offenders in cases
randomly assigned to RJ [conferences] than among the offenders in cases
assigned not to have an RJ [conference].”188 Put differently, there were 7 to
45 per cent fewer repeat convictions (or in one study, arrests) across the ten
experiments.189 Contrary to some expectations, the effects were higher in
violent than property crimes, and as high for adult offenders as juvenile
offenders.190
In sum, the studies show that an RJ conference lasting only a few
hours can have effects measured over the next two years.191 If brief RJ
conferences that undermine offender neutralizations can measurably
decrease recidivism over a period of years, there is every reason to think
that the opposite intervention –interrogations that reinforce the offender
neutralizations – can have the opposite effect, also over a period of years.
As RJ conferences decrease recidivism, the obvious risk of their negation is
to increase recidivism. This seems especially true when there is no
subsequent RJ conference, but one might also expect an RJ conference to
achieve less if the detectives have first entrenched the offender’s
neutralizations.

186
Id. at 1-3. In addition, the review only looked for studies published in English on or after 1994, when there
was some standardization of RJ procedures. The review excluded victim-offender mediations, which operate on a
very different model.
187
Id. at 11.
188
Id.
189
Id. The benefits of RJ are substantially larger than the costs. See Id. at 18, Table 2 (reporting monetized
benefits that exceed costs by ratios of 3.7 to 1 to 8.1 to 1.
190
Id. at 12-13.
191
RJ conferences last one to three hours. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & HEATHER STRANG, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 39 (2007). Compare Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 90, at 279 Table 6 (finding that
65% of interrogations lasted longer than 30 minutes; 28% lasted longer than an hour); Kelly, et al., supra note 94
at 171 (reporting on interrogations that average 1.5 hours).
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While there is much discussion of RJ ideas in the United States,192
and efforts to introduce or expand their use,193 no one has previously noted
that it is the common practice of American police interrogators to do
precisely the opposite. RJ theory demonstrates that the first step in RJ
reform would be to constrain the anti-restorative element of moral
minimization.
3. Neutralization and the Lessons of Entrapment Doctrine
Our claim is that the governmental reinforcement of crime
neutralizations can increase crime. There is a legal doctrine that recognizes
the ability of government actors to cause crime – the entrapment defense.
There would be no need for the defense if it were not possible that
undercover agents or informants could persuade individuals to commit
crimes they would not otherwise commit outside of a sting operation. On
close inspection, entrapment doctrine recognizes the risk of persuading
someone to commit a crime when government agents engage in certain
neutralizations. Although the courts do not use these terms, they find
entrapment in some instances because the undercover agent too effectively
minimized the crime.
In Sorrells v. United States,194 the first Supreme Court case on
entrapment, a crucial fact was the undercover agent’s appeal to a military
bond with the defendant, based on shared service in World War I. The
undercover crime was the sale of intoxicating liquor. As one witness said at
trial, he believed “one former war buddy would get liquor for another.”195
The Court vacated the conviction and remanded so the jury could consider
the entrapment defense.196

192
See, e.g., Lynn S. Branham, ‘Stealing Conflicts’ No More?: The Gaps and Anti-Restorative Elements in
States’ Restorative-Justice Laws, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2020) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the gaps
in American RJ practices).
193
See, e.g., Seema Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard Truths of Progressive Prosecution and a Path to
Realizing the Movement’s Promise, 64 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL LAW REV. 69 (2020)
194
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
195
Id. at 440.
196
Id. at 452.
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Something similar occurred in Sherman v. United States, where the
Court held that the defendant, convicted of selling narcotics, was entitled to
an entrapment defense as a matter of law.197 On several occasions, Sherman
had acquired and shared narcotics with an undercover agent he met when
they were both (he thought) undergoing medical treatment for addiction.
The agent had befriended Sherman and told him that he was “not
responding to treatment” and needed to find narcotics.198 On each occasion,
Sherman charged the agent only his expenses in acquiring the drugs, which
the two shared. The Court noted this unconventional motive for distributing
narcotics and held that the agent’s “resort to sympathy” induced Sherman,
as a fellow addict, to secure the drugs.199
Using the terminology of neutralization, Sorrells and Sherman
involved the tactic of appealing to “higher loyalties” than law, based on
bonds of military service or the alleviation of shared pain. Lower court
cases show other uses of the higher loyalties appeal, as when undercover
operatives claim they need the defendant’s help in committing a crime to
make money needed for their children.200 When considering entrapment in
such a context, contemporary courts are wary precisely when government
“takes advantage of [such] an alternate, non-criminal type of motive,”201
i.e., when they morally justify the crime.
The last Supreme Court case on the defense, Jacobson v. United
States, is more complicated but tells a similar story. The Court found the
defendant Jacobson entrapped as a matter of law into the crime of ordering
child pornography via the mail. Crucial to the Court’s decision were various
communications the government mailed to Jacobson. One was a letter
202

197

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
Id. at 371.
199
Id. at 373. See also id. at 383, 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (stating that the government
should not be allowed to exploit “[a]ppeals to sympathy” “based on mutual experiences with narcotics addiction”
or “friendship”).
200
See United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.1993). See also United States v. Sullivan, 919
F.2d 1403, 1419 & n. 21 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Montanez, 105 F.3d 36, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1997).
201
See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J.) (noting that the entrapment
element of “‘inducement’ consists of an ‘opportunity’ [to offend] plus something else—typically, excessive pressure
by the government upon the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of
motive."). According to a Westlaw search on February 1, 2022, thirty-two of the federal cases and three of the state
cases citing Gendron quote its language about the government’s exploitation of a “noncriminal” “motive.”
202
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
198
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ostensibly from an American Hedonist Society, which stated that members
have a “right to read what we desire . . . [and] to seek pleasure without
restrictions placed on us by outdated puritan morality.”203 A second letter
from a different (fake) organization “founded to protect and promote sexual
freedom and freedom of choice” claimed to be lobbying for the repeal of
legislation defining an age of consent.204 A third letter, purportedly from a
private individual, engaged in “mirroring,” i.e., “reflect[ing] whatever the
interests are of the person” addressed, which, for Jacobson, meant stating a
shared interest in images of young men; the fictional letter-writer also
expressed a preference for amateur pornography because “the actors enjoy it
more.”205 Finally, the letter offering to sell child pornography, from a
supposedly distinct source, decried the “hysterical nonsense” about
pornography and asked “why is your government spending millions of
dollars to exercise international censorship while tons of drugs, which
makes yours the world’s most crime ridden country are passed through
easily”?206
In one sense, the facts of Jacobson are obviously distinguishable
from a few hours of interrogation because the government’s persuasion
campaign there lasted for 26 months. Yet the longevity of the operation in
Jacobson should not obscure the comparison. Many sting operations, as in
Sorrells, are quite brief. Furthermore, one might think that supposedly
private individuals in Jacobson would be less persuasive about what the law
should permit than people known to be law enforcement officials. In any
event, we merely note that the government tactics in Jacobson were tactics
of neutralization. There is denial of injury (the actors enjoy it),
condemnation of the condemnors (blaming the government for an “outdated
puritan morality” and for not taking care of more serious crime), and
appeals to higher authority (the importance of sexual freedom and freedom
of expression). The overall effect of these ostensibly different sources of
communication is to convey that “that receiving this material was
something that petitioner ought to be allowed to do,” i.e., “that he had or
should have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law.”207
203

Id. at 544.
Id.
205
Id. at 545.
206
Id. at 546.
207
Id. at 553.
204
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This is the message of the minimization tactics reviewed above, especially
for sexual assault crimes.
In sum, criminal defendants are sometimes entrapped because the
government agents, using the tools of neutralization, persuade an individual
into a crime. Of course, the undercover agents intend to induce a crime and
police interrogators do not intend to induce the suspect to offend in the
future. But the psychological mechanisms are the same, as are the intended
and unintended risks. Where we recognize the criminogenic possibility for
persuasion in undercover operations, it makes no sense to ignore the parallel
risks of persuasion in interrogation.
Neutralization theory is not, however, the only reason that moral
minimization is criminogenic.
4. Beyond Neutralization: Social Norms and
Legal Legitimacy
One might object to our criminogenic claim by rejecting the theory
of neutralization. The theory claims that the rationalizations precede and
cause the rationalized crime, but it is difficult to rigorously demonstrate the
claim empirically, and powerful evidence does not exist.208
We have two responses. First, there is the goose/gander point
previously explained. The case for using moral minimization is only
plausible if neutralization theory is plausible.209 If neutralization theory is
false, there is no reason to engage in moral minimization. Our second reply

208
For longitudinal evidence of the causal effects of neutralization on crime, see, e.g., Ian W. Shields &
Georgia C. Whitehall, Neutralization & Delinquency Among Teenagers, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 223, 231-32
(1994) (finding among juvenile offenders, weak but positive correlation between high neutralization scores and
subsequent recidivism); Robert Agnew, The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence, 32 CRIMINOL. 555, 572
(2014) (“the longitudinal data suggest that neutralization may be a relatively important cause of subsequent
violence”). An experimental paper demonstrates how an interlocutor can successfully influence subsequent behavior
by arguing for or against the neutralizations. See Immo Fritsche, Predicting Deviant Behavior by Neutralization:
Myths and Findings, 26 DEVIANT BEHAV. 483, 494-95 (2005) (finding experimental support). Yet other evidence
fails to validate the theory. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 151, at 226-27, 228 (concluding that “the relationship
between neutralization and offending is probably not a causal one”); Morris & Copes, supra note 142. The bottom
line is that empirical evidence on the causal effects of neutralization is ultimately mixed.
209
That is why the Reid manual emphasizes reinforcing the same neutralizations the suspect used to commit
the crime. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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is to note that other legal theories and literatures – besides restorative justice
and entrapment doctrine – lead to the same conclusion: that moral
minimization is criminogenic.
a. Social Norms and Expressive Theory
One of the law’s expressive mechanisms for influencing behavior
derives from its ability to signal and strengthen the informal sanctions that
enforce social norms.210 Social norms involve a pattern of disapproval for
counter-normative behavior. The expectation of disapproval itself creates
some incentive to follow the norm because people generally value the
esteem of others.211 Disapproval also predicts more serious informal
sanctions ranging from a censorious look or comment, to gossip and social
ostracism, to violence.212 Where law and social norms overlap, these
informal sanctions explain some legal compliance. People may presume
that democratically enacted laws reveal underlying attitudes of disapproval
for the behavior the law condemns, so that one needs to comply with law to
avoid disapproval, confrontation, and negative gossip. For example, local
laws against public smoking and in favor of public breastfeeding of babies
respectively signal disapproving attitudes about exposing others to one’s
cigarette smoke and approving attitudes about breastfeeding.213 A large part
of the compliance with under-enforced laws may be due to law’s expressive
effects.214 But even if the expected criminal sanctions against, say, theft, are

210
See, e.g., RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 139-52
(2015) [hereinafter MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS]; Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive
Law, 79 OREGON LAW REV. 339-390 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Attitudinal Theory]; Alex Geisinger, “A Belief
Change Theory of Expressive Law,” 88 Iowa Law Rev. 35 (2002).
211
Loss of esteem serves as a basic norms sanction. See MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra note 210, at
1141-43; McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 210, at 142-43. See also GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT,
THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM: AN ESSAY ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY (2004).
212
See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 57-59 (1994); MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra
note 210, at 83-84, 139-40.
213
See MCADAMS, EXPRESSIVE POWERS, supra note 210, at 143, 145.
214
See, e.g., Cevat G. Aksoy, Christopher S. Carpenter, Ralph De Haas, & Kevin Tran, Do Laws Shape
Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in Europe, 124 EUROPEAN ECON. REV.
(2020) (Article 103399) (finding that legal changes recognizing same-sex unions preceded increased tolerant
attitudes toward sexual minorities); Roberto Galbiati, et al., How Laws Affect the Perception of Norms: Empirical
Evidence from the Lockdown, PLOS ONE (Sept. 24, 2021) (finding that lockdown orders significantly strengthened
perception of the relevant social norm); Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law?, 9 AMER. LAW &
ECON. REV. 135 (2007) (finding that mandatory voting laws increased voting for reasons not explained by expected
sanctions); Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE
J. REG. 419 (2011) (finding evidence that mandatory seat belt laws increase belt usage for reasons not explained by
sanctions).
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much more serious than the informal sanctions, the latter still add to the
formal sanctions and generate higher levels of compliance.
Consistent with these ideas, the empirical evidence further
demonstrates that some people comply with law out of a sense of
reciprocity with others.215 For instance, people are more likely to pay their
taxes if they believe others are paying their taxes; less likely if they believe
cheating is rampant.216 Dan Kahan explains the psychology: “The more
strongly she anticipates being condemned by others should she be caught,
the more likely an individual is to refrain from evading. By the same token,
the more regret or remorse an individual believes she'd experience for
engaging in evasion, the less likely she is to do so.”217 Thus, if perceived
compliance is high, the expected social disapproval from violating the law
is high, which makes it shameful; if non-compliance is understood to be
widespread, then the expected disapproval and shame seems not so great.
Moral minimization obviously weakens these informal incentives.
Detectives strive to convince the suspect that the crime is not serious by
giving reasons to expect that the social disapproval will be lower than the
suspect initially believes. As noted, the Reid manual identifies this precise
mechanism: “[I]f the suspect . . . believes that the interrogator can
understand and seem to forgive the offense or suspect, he may believe that
others will also be sympathetic and forgiving.”218 The logic is strong
because the suspect expects the police, perhaps more than anyone, to
disapprove of felonies. Yet if burning a structure is a mere “prank”219 or if
sexual assault merely demonstrates that “Everybody fucks up in life,”220
then the expected social disapproval is lowered. Moral minimizations thus
undermine the enforcement of social norms and the external incentives to
comply with a law that embodies those norms.
215
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. LAW
REV. 71, 74 nn.4-8 (2003).
216
Id. at 80-85 and especially 81, n.21. More recent and more sophisticated empirical research reaches the
same conclusions. See Cristina M. Bott, et al., You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion,
66 MANAGEMENT SCI. 2801, 2810-12 (2020) (informing taxpayers of high compliance rate increased self-reported
taxable income); James Alm, et al., When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and
Tax Compliance, 38 FISCAL STUDIES 587 (2017) (same).
217
Kahan, supra note 215, at 81.
218
INBAU, ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 28, at 341.
219
Commonwealth v. Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120, 1130 (Mass. 2012)
220
State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 864 (Haw. 2020).
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Moreover, the tactic explicitly attacks the reciprocity motive for
compliance by referring to how “everybody” misbehaves in life and
“anyone” would commit the crime under the same circumstances.221 For
employee theft crimes, one manual offers the detectives the most inflated
figures for the frequency of such crimes – that “75% of employees steal
from the workplace and that most do so repeatedly” – precisely to allow the
detective to tell the suspect that far more people commit this type of crime
than they had previously assumed.222 The empirical evidence suggests that
if people believe a crime is exceptionally common, it weakens their
reciprocal incentives to obey the law.
b. Legal Legitimacy Theory
Another literature in law and social science finds that compliance
with the law is inextricably linked with the public’s perception of the law’s
legitimacy.223 In recent years, much has been written about the law’s
procedural sources of legitimacy, and the evidence that many people are
more likely to obey law and cooperate with law enforcement if they
perceive the courts and police to treat them fairly and with respect.224 Other
research emphasizes what might be called the substantive sources of law’s
legitimacy, where many people are more likely to obey law if its content
aligns with their own moral intuition.225 Law is less effective in generating
compliance when people believe the law consistently deviates from what is
morally right.
To see the legitimacy problem posed by moral minimization,
consider some themes from the Reid training that directly attack the
221

Id. and INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 210.
See SENESE, supra note 28, at 141.
223
See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1921) (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 2013).
224
For evidence of the relationship between procedural justice and legal compliance, see TOM TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (revised ed. 2006); Tom R. Tyler, et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving
Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553, 555 (2007); Jonathan Jackson, et al., Why Do People Comply with the
Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1052–53 (2012)..
225
See John M. Darley, Citizens’ Sense of Justice and the Legal System, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH.
SCI. 10 (2001); Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Mandate Violations on
Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 1239 (2008); Paul H. Robinson, et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85
N.Y.U. LAW REV. 1940 (2010).
222
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substantive or procedural legitimacy of regulatory offenses. For smuggling
and customs offenses, interrogators should: “[b]lame the laws, rules,
regulations and policies as being unfair, unrealistic or outdated.”226 For
passport fraud the suggestion is: “Blame the government policy for placing
unfair restrictions on certain countries.”227 For lacking the appropriate
hunting license: “Blame the licensing agency for not providing enough
licensed guides.”228
These examples, however, only make explicit what is already
implicit: moral minimizations inevitably drive a wedge between the formal
criminal law and common moral intuitions. The criminal law treats the
offender’s conduct as morally serious, but the detectives say it is not
serious. The law treats the offender’s claimed excuses and justifications as
irrelevant, but the detective insists they are relevant. In situations where the
law refuses to blame the victim, the detective energetically blames the
victim. In all cases, the interrogator is criticizing the substantive content of
the criminal law for its failure to track morality, thus undermining one
mechanism for legal compliance. Moral minimization seems a peculiarly
effective tool for undermining legal legitimacy because it is carried out by
law enforcement officers – whom the suspects expect to support the legal
rule.229
To summarize this section: if neutralization theory is correct, then
moral minimization probably increases confessions and increases crime.
The success of restorative justice conferences and appellate court reasoning
about entrapment both provide support for the latter, criminogenic claim. If
social norms theory and/or legitimacy theory is correct, then moral
minimization probably increases crime even if it has no effect on
confessions.

226
Id. at 238 (example A2). Alternatively: “Blame the bureaucracy for making it so difficult to obtain the
proper licenses to import items such as protected wildlife or property” (example A1) and “Blame the
government/country for trying to maintain a monopoly on these goods” (example A5). Id.
227
Id. at 210 (example 1).
228
SENESE, supra note 28, at 165 (example C1). Other legitimacy-attacking themes: “Blame the license fee as
being cost prohibitive,” Id. (example C4; cf. Id. at 166 examples D3 and E3) or “Blame license centers for being
too far away.” Id. at 166 (example E2).
229
Of course, those populations who do not perceive the criminal law as having any legitimacy or who are
estranged from the law, will be unaffected by this problem of moral minimization. See supra text accompanying
notes 173-174.
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B. The Criminogenic Risk in Practice
Synthesizing the various causal arguments of the prior section, we
can describe the criminal contexts in which the criminogenic risk is most
and least compelling. Moral minimization poses the greatest risk of
inducing future crimes when (1) the suspect is a marginal offender, (2) the
bases of moral minimization are generalizable In addition, as incarceration
sometimes prevents recidivism, we add a third condition, (3) that the
resulting criminal sentence leaves open the possibility of recidivism. By
contrast, the criminogenic risks are minimal or non-existent when the
suspect is an infra-marginal offender, the moral minimization is not
generalizable, or the criminal sentence itself incapacitates all further
offending. As we show, this means that the risks are greatest for crimes like
theft, assault, and sexual assault and are least significant for the crime of
homicide.
First, we previously explained the significance of an offender being
marginal. If the suspect is a professional criminal, for example, who
commits a certain crime whenever the frequent opportunity arises, then it is
unlikely such a person feels any need to neutralize the crime. Such inframarginal offenders have lost the capacity for feeling guilt or shame for the
particular crime and are unmotivated by social disapproval or the legitimacy
of law. They are therefore not made more likely to offend by moral
minimization, but also not made more likely to confess (the goose/gander
point). For most crimes, many offenders are marginal, but for some crimes,
there may be very few marginal offenders. Drug crimes are a likely
example. That sort of black market, malum prohibitum offense – selling
contraband goods to willing buyers – are frequently committed by
professionals who do not struggle with guilt or shame over the offense.
Second, we referred to moral minimizations being generalizable to
future offenses. Trivializing a crime, as by suggesting that it causes no harm
to steal from a corporation or wealthy individual, offers an excuse that
readily applies to future opportunities for crime. Blaming a crime on
alcohol or drug use does the same, as the offender is likely to be under the
influence again in the future. Most obviously, blaming a female victim of
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assault or rape for the stereotypical reasons we saw in the scripts and
appellate opinions offers an excuse that readily applies to future crimes,
even against the same victim. Most moral minimizations are like these.
Yet some excuses do not generalize. Consider two murder cases
discussed in Part I. Where police detectives offered the suspect the excuse
for murder that he was exacting revenge against the victim for having killed
the suspect’s brother,230 that rationalization probably does not generalize. At
least where only one person committed the sibling’s murder, and the
suspect does not have other family members suffering the same fate, the
offender is unlikely to again encounter another temptation for this kind of
revenge. In another case, detectives proposed to a mother that she set a fire
to kill her special needs daughter because she was making it impossible for
her to properly raise her other three children.231 Again, it is not apparent that
such an excuse could ever apply to a future situation the mother will face. A
non-murder example is the accidental hit-and-run crime. Most people who
accidentally hit someone with their car and then flee will not accidentally
hit another person in the future; reinforcing their neutralizations for flight
cannot risk causing many of them to commit the crime again.
Third, a criminal sentence may prevent future recidivism. There is
no criminogenic risk if the resulting confession leads to sentence of
incarceration for life and the offender cannot re-offend in prison. If a 50year old man convicted of sexual abuse of a child receives a thirty-year
sentence, he is unlikely to re-offend regardless of the reinforcement of his
neutralizations, in which case there is no criminogenic downside to using
the tactic to secure his confession.
In most instances, however, the resulting sentence will not
permanently incapacitate the offender. First, some offenses – revenge-based
assaults, for example – can be and are committed within prison, so the
neutralization might promote recidivism during incarceration.232 Second,
the Reid manuals propose moral minimizations for crimes that typically do
230

People v. Jones, No. 1-17-1623, 2021 WL 1227837, *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 31, 2021).
See Coughlin, supra note 17 (citing the transcripts).
232
See Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1221-1222 (2021).
231
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not produce life-long prison terms: assault and sexual assault, hate crimes,
arson, embezzlement, and other theft crimes. Such offenders, like most
offenders, are released from prison, so we must be concerned about their reoffending.233
To be clear, we do not argue in favor of prison as a means of
incapacitation. To the contrary, if one wishes to decrease society’s use of
prison, and especially if one wants to eliminate its use, it is essential to take
every non-coercive action possible to dissuade offenders from re-offending,
which certainly includes not encouraging future crime through moral
minimization. Put differently, we should never allow government to
perversely justify an increment of prison for its incapacitative effect by
saying that an offender is a particular threat to re-offend when that claim is
even partly true because police detectives persuaded a marginal offender on
the generalizable excuses and justifications for the crime.234
The net result of this analysis is that the criminogenic risk does not
seem particularly large for the offenses of homicide or hit-and-run, but is
great for the far more common crimes of theft, assault, robbery, and sexual
assault.235 Because there are so many perpetrators of these latter crimes, it
stands to reason that some non-trivial number of them are marginal
offenders. The moral minimizations police offer are generalizable reasons
for trivializing the crime, for avoiding responsibility, and for blaming
victims. And there is no reason to think that the criminal sentence is
permanently incapacitating: assault and sexual assault obviously occurs in
prison; for all of these crimes, most offenders are eventually released.
To illustrate, consider again the crime of employees stealing from
employers. Substantial evidence suggests that employees do, in fact,
233
See Danielle Kaeble, Time Served in State Prison, 2016, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (Nov.
2018) (“Most violent offenders (57%) released from state prison in 2016 served less than three years in prison before
their initial release. About 1 in 25 violent offenders (3.6%) served 20 years or more.”), at
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf.
234
Similarly, we disagree with criminologists who think there is only a social gain to fine-turning moral
minimization. See Copes, et al., supra note 39 (reporting on interviews with 59 convicted identity thieves still in
prisons, as a means of helping future Reid-trained investigators interrogate identity thieves).
235
See John Gramlick, What the Data Says (and Doesn’t Say) About Crime in the United States, Pew Research
Center (Nov. 20, 2020) (showing that murder and non-negligent manslaughter rates are about 5 per 100,000, while
other felonies range from 42.6 per 100,000 (rape) to 1,549 per 100,000 (larceny/theft)), at
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/20/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/.
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rationalize such theft by focusing on what they perceive as the unfairness of
being paid too little,236 meaning that many such offenders need to neutralize
their crime and are therefore marginal. The moral minimizations we saw in
the first example in the introduction are entirely generalizable: blame the
victim for not paying an appropriate wage and appeal to high loyalties by
saying that the employee stole to support his needy family. The sentencing
may involve no prison or a short prison term, so if the offender can acquire
another job, they will face the same temptations.
In sum, there are a few situations in which the criminogenic risks of
moral minimization seem insignificant, but in most cases, they are
substantial.
C. The Expressive Objection to the Criminogenic Claim
An objection to our criminogenic claim is that other government
expression contradicts the detective’s moral minimization. On this view,
after a confession is obtained, the government disavows and nullifies the
detective’s message by the subsequent prosecution, conviction, and criminal
punishment of the offender. The criminal defendant infers from the
experience that there was no truth to the interrogating detectives’ moral
minimizations. The interrogator said the crime was not serious, that anyone
would have done the same, and that the real blame lies with the victim or
society, but the prosecution and punishment show that society regards the
crime to be serious and the suspect-convict to be morally responsible. The
criminal process expresses the true moral status of the convict’s conduct
and this “counter-programming” erases any effects of the detective’s moral
minimization.
This optimistic account connects to an old idea in criminal theory
that punishment is expressive, i.e., that it communicates societal

236
See Jerald Greenberg, Stealing in the Name of Justice: Informational and Interpersonal Moderators of
Theft Reactions to Underpayment Inequity, 54 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 81 (1993); Jerald
Greenberg, Employee Theft as a Reaction to Underpayment Inequity: The Hidden Cost of Pay Cuts, 75 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 561 (1990).
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condemnation of the criminal act.237 This expressive objection is, however,
unduly optimistic, for three reasons.
First, as previously discussed, not everyone who is interrogated is
convicted. Some suspects who receive the moral minimizations are innocent
and not convicted; some are guilty, but do not confess and are not
convicted. Each year, thousands of such suspects hear the interrogator
minimize the seriousness of a category of offenses and/or blame victims,
but receive no expressive corrective from the law.
Second, although we contend below that most suspects will never
infer that the detectives were lying in their moral minimizations, we note
that a distinct problem arises if suspects do reach this conclusion. Police
deception undermines procedural legitimacy.238 The basic claims of this
literature are that (1) “citizens are more likely to comply and cooperate with
police and obey the law when they view the police as legitimate,” and (2)
“[t]he most common pathway that the police use to increase citizen
perceptions of legitimacy is through the use of procedural justice,” which
involves the police treating civilians fairly and respectfully.239 Legitimacy
“increase[s] both willing deference to rules and the decisions of the police
and courts, as well as the motivation to help with the task of maintaining
social order in the community.”240 Yet a simple enough prerequisite for
police legitimacy is honesty; lying destroys procedural justice.241 Thus, if
suspects later infer that the detectives were deceptive when offering moral
minimizations, the tactic is still criminogenic. To pin one’s hopes on
suspects figuring out that the sympathy the police extended was merely a
ploy, is merely to hope that the system loses procedural instead of
substantive legitimacy. Either damages legal compliance.
237
Indeed, even to define punishment, one influential account says that it is necessary to distinguish criminal
sanctions from other forms of harsh treatment the government imposes on rule violators. See Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95-118
(1970). See also ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Kenworthey Bilz,
Testing the Expressive Theory of Punishment, 13 J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 358 (2016).
238
See Margareth Etienne & Richard McAdams, Police Deception in Interrogation as a Problem of
Procedural Legitimacy, 54 TEX. TECH LAW REV. 21 ((2021).
239
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, U.S. DEPT. JUST. OFF. CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. (May 2015), at 11 (https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf).
240
Tom R. Tyler, et al., Psychology of Procedural Justice and Cooperation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4011 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014).
241
See Etienne & McAdams, supra not 238; Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New Again: Fundamental
Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 105, 109-110 (2005) (stating that trust
and belief that authority figures will act fairly is a key factor for procedural justice).
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Third, and most importantly, even when the guilty suspect confesses
and is convicted, criminal proceedings will usually fail to undo the effect of
the neutralizations. Remember that what matters here is not the message
intended, or the message that most citizens receive, but the message the
suspect receives from his encounter with the criminal justice system. To
begin, nothing in the moral minimization technique leads the suspect to
expect not to be prosecuted. Indeed, the manuals repeatedly express concern
that the police not make promises of that level of leniency, for it would
obviously incentivize false confessions if suspects thought that a confession
would be the immediate end of the matter.242 Even after moral
minimization, therefore, the suspect expects to be prosecuted and the
prosecutor’s decision to bring charges does not negate the detective’s
reinforcement of the suspect’s neutralizations.
Some may argue that a defendant who pleads guilty after a
confession must show some new understanding that their behavior was
seriously wrong and not the victim’s fault. Yet a guilty plea need not
represent any appreciation of wrongdoing. Defendants often plead guilty for
strategic reasons having little to do with consciousness of wrongdoing. The
literature on false confessions and resulting guilty pleas is one example
where defendants do not believe what they say in the plea colloquy.243 The
literature on remorse during pleas and sentencing hearings tells a similar
story.244 The concern that defendants sometimes tell the court just what it
wants to hear245 is consistent with the notion that we may not really know
what portion of the minimizing narrative the defendant might believe.

242

See INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 203, 425; JAYNE & BUCKLEY, FIELD GUIDE, supra note 20, at 277-79.
Guilty Pleas and False Confessions, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article4.pdf (“People who falsely
confess are likely to believe that they have no meaningful chance of winning at trial.”).
244
See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the
Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y. U LAW REV. 2103, 2123-24 (2003) (explaining that federal courts make highly
subjective findings of remorse in determining whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for their conduct for
sentencing purposes); Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 142 (“The
existing empirical literature, though limited, generally agrees that offenders’ remorse, in practice, does have an
impact on legal decision-makers’ perceptions and judgments about them.”).
245
Etienne, supra note 244, at 2162-63 (“True remorse cannot be scheduled to appear precisely at the time of
the crime or on the sentencing date”).
243
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Punishment is arguably different, but the mere fact of punishment is
not sufficient to negate the moral minimizations. First, there is uncertainty
in the communicative content of non-traditional punishments, i.e.,
probation, fines, and community service.246 Even when the sentence
involves prison, some observers may think that an unexpectedly light
sentence fails to condemn the criminal act and even condones it. Consider
the infamous sentence of six months of prison for Brock Turner for the
crime of rape.247 Many understood the sentence as failing to condemn the
crime. If the detectives in his case had, in interrogations of Turner,
minimized the seriousness of his crime and/or blamed the victim, as with
scripts noted above, it seems doubtful that such a short sentence, far below
the mean for rape, would obliterate the effect of their neutralizations. To the
contrary, a felon may infer from unexpected leniency that the minimizations
were correct.248
Even where the suspect is convicted and the criminal sentence is
widely perceived by the public as fully sufficient to condemn the criminal
act, the punishment will not necessarily undo the effect of moral
minimization on the offender. The offender has now received two
conflicting messages: the first from the detectives and the second from the
sentencing judge who reveals the punishment the state will inflict. The
question is how the offender will resolve the expressive conflict.
The optimistic account is that the second communication
(punishment) nullifies the first (moral minimization). Yet another
possibility exists. The offender may view the minimizing message as
demonstrating that the criminal sentence does not actually reflect
community sentiment. The public is sometimes surprised by the harshness
as well as the leniency of a particular criminal sentence, so any given
sentence might not reflect common morality.249 If so, then instead of
interpreting the judge’s criminal sentence as negating the detective’s moral
246

See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 CHI. LAW REV. 591 (1996).
See Peter Fimrite, Ex-Stanford Swimmer to Serve 6 Months in Unconscious Woman’s Rape, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (June 3, 2016).
248
To be absolutely clear, we do not believe that the police use of neutralizations in interrogation should ever
justify longer prison terms. Instead, we think that the failure of shorter prison terms or alternative sentencing to
undo the damage of moral minimization is a reason not to use the tactic.
249
See, e.g., Robinson, et al., supra note 225, at 1974 (reporting that many people believe the appropriate
punishment for drug offenses, three-strikes laws, strict liability offenses, and felony murder are far below actual
punishments); 1975-78 (describing other studies finding the same divergences).
247
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minimizations, the offender can interpret the detective’s moral
minimizations as negating the condemnatory message of the judge’s
criminal sentence.
The latter inference is the more likely one, for three reasons. First,
the interrogators’ communications may be more powerful than the judge’s.
The detectives deliver their patient minimizations in the intimate space of
an interrogation room, as part of an emotional performance seeking to
connect sympathetically with the offender.250 Lacking physical proximity to
the defendant, the judge is often pressed for time and delivers the sentence
in a busy public courtroom, using legal boilerplate, and is therefore less
likely to seek or create an emotional connection with the defendant.
Detectives are selected in part for their ability to develop rapport with
suspects during interrogation, but judges are elite technocrats selected more
for legal proficiency. Suspects might imagine the detectives being more in
touch with common morality.
Second, that fact that the judge has “the last word” by speaking after
the detectives is not an advantage. To the contrary, people are often subject
to “confirmation bias,” in which they interpret new evidence in a distorted
way to preserve their existing belief.251 People are particularly prone to
confirmation when it comes to preserving positive opinions about
themselves; they resist negative feedback.252 As the detective’s minimizing
message reinforces the offender’s pre-existing neutralizations, the literature
on the bias predicts that the offender will make all possible inferences to
preserve the neutralizing beliefs. Confirmation bias is even more likely
when beliefs are motivated rather than rational,253 as is true here: the
offender simply prefers to believe that the detectives have articulated
community mores more accurately than the law or the judge. The offender
knows that the criminal law does sometimes “get it wrong” (fails to track
moral intuitions), and conveniently reasons that this sentence is one of those
250
Recall David Simon’s description of detectives putting their arm around the suspect and appearing to be on
the verge of tears. SIMON, supra note 3, at 212.
251
See, e.g., Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, in PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 387 (Jerome Busemeyer, et al. eds, 1995); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
252
See David Eil & Justin M. Rao, The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective
Information about Yourself. 3 AMER. ECON. J.: MICROECON.114 (2011).
253
See Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THINKING AND REASONING 295, 295-96 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005).
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occasions. Offenders want to believe the forgiving and justifying things the
detective says, not what society wants its criminal punishment to express.
The self-serving inference is always easier than the self-critical one.
Third, if there were an advantage to the judge having the “last word”
in a sentencing hearing, it would only be because the judge could answer
the specific minimizing statements the detectives made. Yet this possible
advantage is lost because the judge usually has no idea what the detectives
said to the offender during interrogation. If the defendant contests the
voluntariness of the confession and if the defendant’s briefing describes the
minimizing details (even though they are not usually legally relevant on
their own), the judge would learn what the detectives said. Yet that is rare.
Ordinarily, the judge is ignorant of (1) which of the offenders they are
sentencing were subject to the tactic of moral minimization, and, when the
tactic was employed, (2) what the particular moral minimizations were.
Detectives tailor their minimizing message to match the offender’s actual
neutralizations, but it hardly be called a “counter-message” if the judge does
not tailor his remarks to what the detectives said.
If the prosecutor and judge fail, the final objection to our claim may
be that other criminal justice players provide a counter-message that undoes
the criminogenic damage of moral minimization. Perhaps the detectives,
defense lawyer, jury, or victim provide the expressive antidote. As things
stand, however, where there is no recognition of the problem, there is no
reason to think these actors do provide an effective remedy.
We find no evidence that any detectives “debrief” the suspect after
interrogation, which detectives might naturally resist as long as there is a
chance the defendant might try to recant the confession (which such
debriefing would make more likely). Defense attorneys may explain to
defendants that their rationalizations for the crime are not legally relevant,
but it seems improbable that any will articulate the moral wrongfulness of
their client’s behavior to their client.
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Juries offer no counter-message for the simple reason that almost all
cases are resolved by guilty plea.254 We pause to note that this observation
provides another reason that the scarcity of criminal juries is troubling.
Juries are the best positioned of all actors in the system to undo moral
minimization. They are a collective body drawn from the community who
can therefore speak for the community.255 If jury trials were common, we
would therefore worry less (but still worry) about the criminogenic effects
of moral minimization. Note that when the first Reid interrogation manual
was published in 1962, jury trials were far more common than they are
today, which might be one reason for the absence of concerns about the
criminogenic effects when moral minimization was first introduced.
Victim impact testimony is promising. If presented in front of the
convicted defendant at a sentencing hearing, it might undo some of the
damage of moral minimization. The most plausible case is where the
minimization involved a detective claiming that the victim was not “really”
harmed; given the chance, victims can powerfully articulate their harm.
Moreover, the place of esteem and respect with which those statements are
regarded within the proceeding offers evidence of the victim’s worth,
pushing against any victim-blaming narrative.256 The need to remedy moral
minimization therefore provides a non-standard rationale for giving the
victim this voice.257
But there are severe limitations. Even among the offenses for which
we claim the criminogenic effect is likely, not every case has an individual
natural victim (some theft victims are collectives or corporations), not every
state guarantees the victim’s right to give testimony in every case,258 and
not every victim is available or willing to testify in this way (especially in
sexual assault cases). When victims do testify, they are (thankfully)
ignorant that the detectives minimized the offense during interrogation, so
254
Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the Disappearing Jury Trial: Perspectives from
Attorneys and Judges, 81 LA. L. REV. 119, 122 (stating that 3.6% of federal criminal cases were disposed of by jury
trials in 2013).
255
Youngjae Lee, The Criminal Jury, Moral Judgments, and Political Representation, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L.
REV. 1255, 1270-1272 (2018).
256
See Bilz, supra note 237.
257
See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
338 (2002). See also Julian V. Roberts & Edna Erez, Communication in Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive
Function of Victim Impact Statements, 10 INT'L REV. OF VICTIMOLOGY 223, 226 (2004).
258
See DUBBER, supra note 257.
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they cannot frame their remarks to address the minimizations. Finally, while
we think victims can convincing speak to harm, we worry that the
detective’s victim-blaming tactics may render the offender immune to being
persuaded by what the victim says in court, or from the respect the judge
shows the victim. Certainly, victim impact statements would work better to
induce the offender’s sympathy and remorse if they occurred without the
government officials having first privately “reinforced” the offender’s
reasons for blaming the victim.259
Our ultimate point is rather simple. There are a variety of
governmental actors who communicate, by words or actions, to criminal
offenders. For a variety of reasons, it matters to the offender’s future
behavior whether the government delivers a unified and consistent message
– the offender’s conduct was seriously wrong and the offender was
responsible for it – or conflicting messages that both condemn and condone
the criminal act. The presence of moral minimization is particularly likely
to compromise or nullify the contrary messages because they are delivered
at a critical early moment in an empathetic manner by detectives from
whom the suspect expects disapproval. Whatever the possibilities for
remediation with other messages, the criminal system is not designed to
offset the criminogenic damage of moral minimizations.
In sum, moral minimization undermines internal and informal
motivations for legal compliance. American police detectives contribute to
crime control by investigating and clearing crimes, but frequently employ
an interrogation tactic at cross purposes, making crime more likely. The
benefits of moral minimization are uncertain, and the costs are serious.
III. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF MINIMIZATION ON POLICING
We hypothesize that the interrogation tactic of moral minimization
has consequences beyond the interrogation room. Our first point concerned
the criminogenic effect on interrogated suspects. Now we reach our second
259
There is also a separate normative issue whether victim impact statements exacerbate criminal law
disparities because judges and juries find some victims more appealing than others for arbitrary or racial reasons.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Threat Versus Racial Empathy in Sentencing – Capital and Otherwise, 41 AMER. J.
CRIM. LAW 1, 13-18, 27-29 (2013); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 361, 376 (1996).
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point: the unintended effects of minimization on the interrogating police
officers themselves.
The starkest example of this danger arises in the interrogator’s
treatment of victims, particularly female victims of sexual assault and
domestic violence. Recall some examples from Part I. In a domestic
homicide case, the Reid manual proposes to call the female victim “an
unbearable creature” “who would either drive a man insane or to
violence.”260 The manual adds gratuitously: “In this respect, however, the
investigator stated that the suspect’s wife was just like most other
women.”261 For rape interrogations, recall the Reid manual statement that
“the most common theme to develop in sexual assaults is to blame the
victim for doing something that provoked the suspect,”262 as by dressing
provocatively,263 acting like a prostitute,264 or driving the suspect to the
“point of no return.”265 In sum: “The victim initially came on to the suspect
and he acted the way any man would.”266 Among appellate opinions
involving sexual assault, recall the interrogator’s words that women are “a
lot more promiscuous” when they drink,267 that underage girls “came on” to
the suspect, and they “consented” to sex.268 There was the empathetic line
of one detective: “You're a man. And that I get. It's happened to me.”269 The
misogyny is pervasive, but with a single exception in a supplemental
manual on child abuse cases, the Reid manuals do not say the victimblaming statements are false.270
American detectives receive training in victim-blaming, as an
interrogation technique, and practice that technique over long careers. In
this Part, we explain the result: a detective cadre that is more likely to
engage in victim-blaming in their investigative work outside of the
interrogation room. Partly, this is because the anticipation of using the
260

INBAU, ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 28, at 148-49.
Id.
See SENESE, supra note 28, at 224 (emphasis in original).
263
INBAU, ET AL., supra note 1, at 221
264
Id. at 222.
265
Id. Recall too that the misogyny extends to blaming the wife of the suspect for failing “to take care of him
sexually.” Id. at 228.
266
Id. at 204.
267
Baker, supra note 100, at 864.
268
Aguirre, supra note 117, at *2.
269
Gomez, supra note 47, at *1-2.
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See text accompanying notes 176. See also Coughlin, supra note 17, at 1946-49.
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technique likely influences who seeks to become a detective. Partly, this is
because some detectives are slowly lulled into believing the victim-blaming
stories they tell, at least to some degree. If so, then the interrogation
technique of victim-blaming has a deleterious effect on policing because
detectives are less motivated to take seriously crimes for which they are less
sympathetic to and trusting of the victims. Although we focus on genderbased examples, our analysis is equally applicable to other victim-blaming
based on age, race, religion, sexual orientation, or other factors.
We begin in Part A with a description of hyper-masculinity in police
culture, and how it impedes the investigations into crimes against women.
Part B explains how the victim-blaming tactic reinforces this hypermasculine culture and its associated problems.
A. The General Problem of Hyper-Masculine Police Culture and
Victim-Blaming
Americans are generally inclined to blame victims, and particularly
victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Psychologists studying the
general phenomenon start with the pervasive “belief in a just world,” the
idea that people generally get what they deserve, which means they
generally deserve what they get.271 To preserve an exaggerated belief in a
just world, people look for ways to find that good and bad outcomes are
deserved. For bad outcomes, that means blaming the victim. Undeserved
suffering threatens the just world belief; victim-blaming sustains it.272
Feminist scholars have explored the particular ways in which crimes against
women are blamed on the women victims, which is a major reason that
sexual assault and domestic assault crimes are under-reported and a major
barrier to effective solutions.273
271
See Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion
or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 203, 203-04 (1966). For a review of the literature, see Carolyn L.
Hafer & Robbie Sutton, Belief in a Just World, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THEORY AND RESEARCH 145 (Clara
Sabbagh and Manfred Schmitt eds. 2016). See also Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Richard H.
McAdams, Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 311
(2009).
272
See, e.g., GERTRUDE J. SELZNICK & STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE TENACITY OF PREJUDICE 63 (1969) (“Far
from evoking sympathy, the Nazi persecutions apparently sparked a rise in anti-Semitism in this country.”).
273
See, e.g., Michele R. Decker, et al., ‘You Do Not Think of Me as a Human Being’: Race and Gender
Inequities Intersect to Discourage Police Reporting of Violence Against Women, 96 J. URB. HEALTH 772, 778
(2019); Dara E. Purvis, Melissa Blanco, Police Sexual Violence: Police Brutality, #METOO, Masculinities, 108
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There is no reason to think that police are immune from the
tendency to blame victims. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that
police are more likely than the general public to make such inferences.274 A
major reason is the intensively masculine culture of policing. Not only are
the large majority of police officers male,275 but police culture celebrates the
warrior values of strength, power, and honor. Rudy Cooper describes one
feature of police hyper-masculinity as the need for officers to confront
disrespect or disobedience with violence.276 Police officers often engage in
masculinity contests that require the domination of civilians in order to
counter signs of actual or perceived disrespect.277 They “get ‘macho’ with
civilians” and they then justify their actions on the grounds that they were
forced into a position of violence by their victims.278 Thus, police officers
can readily identify with the need to blame the victim for the victim’s own
role in creating a situation where violence or aggression occurs
Perhaps it is not surprising then that social science research shows
that police officers are more likely than members of the general population
to be the perpetrators of violence in their intimate relationships.279 In one of
the most expansive studies on officer involved domestic violence (OIDV),
examining seven law-enforcement agencies across various states,280 fiftyfour per cent of the officers surveyed said they knew of an officer in their
department who had been involved in an abusive relationship and forty-five
percent knew of an officer who had been reported for abusive behavior.281
CALIF. L. REV. 1487 (2020).
274
See, e.g., Emma Sleath & Ray Bull, Police Perceptions of Rape Victims and the Impact on Case Decision
Making: A Systematic Review, 34 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 102, 103 (2015).
275
Lindsey Van Ness, Percentage of Women in State Policing Has Stalled Since 2000, PEW STATELINE (Oct,
20, 2021) (“[W]omen make up less than 13% of full-time police officers in the United States”), at
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/10/20/percentage-of-women-in-statepolicing-has-stalled-since-2000.
276
Frank Rudy Cooper, America’s Police Culture Has a Masculinity Problem, THE CONVERSATION (July 19,
2016, 6:07 AM), https://theconversation.com/americas-police-culture-has-a-masculinity-problem-62666.
277
Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 677 (2009).
278
Id. at 674.
279
See, e.g., Leanor Boulin Johnson, et al., Violence in Police Families: Work-Family Spillover, 20 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 3 (2005).
280
Andrew H. Ryan, The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in Police Families, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY
POLICE OFFICERS 297 (Donald C. Sheehan ed., 2000).
281
Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police Officers Who Commit Partner
Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183, 1191 (2015). These figures drop considerably when officers self-report about their
own experiences and behaviors. Only 10% of the surveyed officers reported that they themselves had physically

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4044000

70

Etienne & McAdams

[Spring 2022]

Studies suggest a domestic violence rate two to four times higher than in the
general population.282 Even the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) recognizes the prevalence of intimate partner incidents
among police officers.283
Research also shows that sexual misconduct among police officers is
not uncommon.284 Sexual misconduct ranges from serious acts of violence
and assault to invasions of privacy and invasive searches, to non-violent but
more common acts of sexual harassment or quid pro quo promises of
leniency.285 One study focused on the persistent problem of police officers
who stop vehicles for traffic violations in order to get a closer look, seek
sexual favors or otherwise sexually harass or abuse female drivers.286 In a
study involving interviews of twenty police chiefs from agencies in major
metropolitan areas, most cited police culture as the single most important
factor influencing sexual misconduct among officers.287
Hyper-masculine police culture is also associated with the pervasive
failure to properly investigate violent crimes against women, particularly
domestic and sexual assault. The IACP has questioned whether abusers can
be effective in dealing with domestic violence calls and investigations.288
When the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) investigates individual
police departments for a “pattern or practice” of misconduct,289 they usually
focus on unlawful uses of force, but a common theme is the failure to
abused a partner. Id. Unless officers are overwhelmingly prone to overestimate the problem, the discrepancy is
another sign of an individual’s ability to neutralize their own criminal behavior. See also Brenda L. Russell &
Nicholas Pappas, Officer Involved Domestic Violence: A Future of Uniform Response and Transparency, 20 INT’L
J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 134, 135 (2018) (noting four OIDV studies in the preceding eighteen years, three of which
used one survey item).
282
See Conor Fiedersdorf, Police Have a Much Bigger Domestic Violence Problem Than the NFL, THE
ATLANTIC (Sep. 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/09/police-officers-who-hit-theirwives-or-girlfriends/380329/.
283
Domestic
Violence,
INT’L
ASS’N
OF
CHIEFS
OF
POLICE
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/domestic-violence.
284
Timothy Maher, Cops on the Make: Police Officers Using Their Job, Power, and Authority to Pursue Their
Personal Sexual Interests, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 32, 33-34 (2007).
285
Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring Police Sexual Violence Against
Women, 12 JUST. QUARTERLY 85, 94-96 (1995).
286
Maher, supra note 290.
287
Timothy Maher, Police Chiefs’ Views on Police Sexual Misconduct, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 239, 246
(2008).
288
Keith W. Strandberg, Domestic Abuse Among Cops, 26 L. ENF’T TECH. 38, 38-41 (1999).
289
See 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (originally codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14141). See Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work, 1994-Present (2017), at
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download.
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properly investigate violent crimes against women. For example, in 2011,
the DOJ investigated police in New Orleans and found “a sweeping failure
to properly investigate many potential cases of rape, attempted rape, and
other sex crimes.”290 When police did investigate, detectives frequently
used “problematic interviewing techniques” that exhibited “stereotypes
regarding how a victim behaves in a ‘real’ case of rape.”291 Also, “The
documentation we reviewed was replete with stereotypical assumptions and
judgments about sex crimes and victims of sex crimes, including misguided
commentary about the victims’ perceived credibility, sexual history, or
delay in contacting the police.”292
Scholars of sexual assault find the problem to be a general one.
Corey Rayburn Yung explains:
[P]olice are the largest obstacle to the prosecution and
conviction of rapists in the United States. Police disbelieve
rape victims far more often than the public and other agents
involved in rape investigations. Research shows police
believe ‘rape myths’ at a much higher rate leading to
widespread distrust of rape victims; . . . As a result, police
often conclude that rape complaints are false without
investigating or, in some cases, even interviewing the victim.
. . . Research shows that police departments failed to
investigate approximately one million forcible rape
complaints from 1995 to 2012.293
A parallel problem exists for domestic violence complaints. For
example, the DOJ report on the New Orleans police also found failures to
investigate such complaints.294 The problem is compounded by the fact that
police departments fail to investigate their own members for domestic
violence. Another DOJ investigation of police officers in Puerto Rico found
290
CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT xi
(2011) [hereafter NOLA Report], https://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf.
291
Id. at 47.
292
Id. at xi. Thus, they “routinely ask[ed] questions that are likely to heighten many victims’ feelings of shame
and self-blame, fear of not being believed, and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system.” Id. at 46.
293
Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, B.C. L. REV. 205, 210 (2017).
294
See NOLA Report, supra note 291, at 50-51.
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significant intimate partner abuse among police officers.295 Tolerating
domestic abuse within police exacerbates the general difficulty of
investigating such abuse because it makes victims more reluctant to report
such crimes to a police force.296 Indeed, it is easy to see the connection from
the statements domestic violence survivors have made about the police
officers on the scene. Consider three examples: (1) “The police acted as if
was my fault because I was married. One policeman said, if he was my
husband, he’d beat me.”297 (2) “I was told I shouldn’t make my abuser
angry. I should try to make him happy.”298 (3) “They feel as though that the
woman automatically did something to provoke the man.”299
The male dominated culture also tends to be self-perpetuating, as it
deters and resists entry by women officers.300 Women encounter sexual
harassment from the moment they enter a police academy, and on the job.301
In summary, victim-blaming characterizes policing responses to
sexual assault and domestic violence offenses, which impedes the
successful prosecution of such crimes. Now we turn to why victim-blaming
narratives in interrogations tend to make the problem worse.
B. The Consequences of the Technique of Blaming Women
To significantly improve the investigation of violent crimes against
women, we require a change in police culture. The training and practice of
295
CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/09/08/prpd_letter.pdf. The DOJ found that within a five
year period ranging from 2005 and 2010, approximately 1,459 victims accused their law enforcement spouses or
partners of abusing them, but the complaints were not taken seriously. Id. at 16.
296
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING GENDER BIAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 21 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/799366/download. See
also Goodmark, supra note 282, at 1199-1204. Purvis, et al., supra note 273.
297
Edna Erez and Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women’s Assessment of the Criminal
Processing System’s Responses, 13 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 251, 256 (1998).
298
Id.
299
Michele R. Decker, et al., ‘You Do Not Think of Me as a Human Being’: Race and Gender Inequities
Intersect to Discourage Police Reporting of Violence Against Women, 96 J. URB. HEALTH 772, 778 (2019).
300
See Lindsey Van Ness, Percentage of Women in State Policing Has Stalled Since 2000, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUST’S: STATELINE
(Oct.
20,
2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2021/10/20/percentage-of-women-in-state-policing-has-stalled-since-2000.
301
See, e.g., Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2010) (describing sexual harassment
of sole African American woman at police academy). See also Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, ‘There Oughtta
Be a Law Against Bitches': Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 439, 441
(2002).
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victim-blaming stands in the way of that change. At best, these interrogation
techniques entrench a culture of hyper-masculinity.302 At worst, the
misogynistic tropes imported from 1962 exacerbate the problem.
In making our claim, we acknowledge that professional interrogators
know they are playing an informational game with their suspects. Part of
that game is a strategy of deception. We are not generally inclined to think
that professional interrogators conflate what they believe and what they say
to suspects. For example, if a detective tries to sow distrust among
suspected co-conspirators, we are confident that the detectives know when
they exaggerate the cooperation of one suspect when speaking to the other.
The interrogator is an actor who can generally distinguish the role from the
self. Notwithstanding this point, however, there are particular risks when
interrogators repeatedly play the role of the misogynist, the racist, the
homophobe, the Islamophobe, and bigots of other varieties in order to carry
out a theme of victim-blaming.
There are two mechanisms by which the training and practice of
victim-blaming in interrogation influences policing more broadly: selfselection and persuasion. Self-selection refers to the simple fact the
characteristics of a job affects who is drawn into that job, which means that
one can indirectly change the characteristics of the employees by changing
the characteristics of the job.303
Detectives perform a variety of investigative tasks, but one
significant part of the job is interrogating suspects. If the occupation of
police interrogator is defined as requiring expertise in persuasively
deploying victim-blaming narratives, this makes it more likely that
individuals who seek the position are those who are comfortable with such
narratives, including those for whom a victim-blaming tactic does not
actually require lying. By contrast, police officers who are repelled by the
thought of playing this role, or simply lack the psychological capacity to
fake the necessary sympathy for the hate-motivated perpetrator (especially
302

Cortney A. Franklin, Male Peer Support and the Police Culture, 16 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST., no. 3, 2005,

at 1, 11.
303
For a general self-selection model of policing, see Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Richard H.
McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEG. STUDIES 105
(2016).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4044000

74

Etienne & McAdams

[Spring 2022]

when the officer shares the victim’s sex, race, sexual orientation, or
religion), are less likely to seek the job. We are assuming, of course, that the
content of interrogation training is not a secret for rank and file officers, but
that interrogation stories circulate within the police department. If so, the
officers who find victim-blaming odious will see less value in acquiring a
job that involves deploying such tropes, and are therefore less likely on the
margin to become detectives. As a result, those who choose to become
detectives will not be a general cross section of police officers; they will
disproportionately be those who are less repelled by the need to endorse
misogynistic and other bigoted thinking, and who are fully capable of
showing sympathy to the perpetrators’ victim-blaming.
Second, aside from self-selection, there is persuasion. The training
and practice of victim-blaming may insidiously persuade its practitioners to
take such thinking more seriously. Unlike criminal suspects, who may hear
a victim-blaming narrative in the interrogation room once or twice in a
lifetime, interrogators are exposed to the narrative repeatedly over a career,
either by listening to a fellow detective or by actively deploying the tactic
themselves. Doubtlessly, some detectives never lose their repulsion at
victim-blaming tropes even as they deploy them. Yet even if some or most
detectives resist, other detectives may slowly internalize the narrative to
some degree. Even dramatic actors sometimes struggle to separate their own
lives with their character’s lives. Given a general American tendency to
blame victims, it would be surprising if this constant exposure and rehearsal
of the tropes had absolutely no tendency to persuade any detectives to find
the logic of victim-blaming more acceptable.
At least two psychological mechanisms are potentially at work here:
cognitive dissonance and the illusory truth effect. If one aims to say things
one does not believe, there is a dissonance between one’s words and
actions, which is partly relieved by moving one’s beliefs closer to the things
one is saying.304 Or as Kurt Vonnegut put it: “We are what we pretend to
be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.”305
304
Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview
of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: REEXAMINING A PIVOTAL THEORY IN PSYCH.
(Eddie Harmon-Jones ed., 2nd ed. 2019).
305
KURT VONNEGUT, Introduction to MOTHER NIGHT (1966 ed.) (1962).
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Illusory truth refers to the fact that mere familiarity makes things
seem more true. This is why lies are more persuasive if they are frequently
repeated.306 People overweigh the truth of the repeated statement, even
when it comes from a single source, because the repetition makes the
statement familiar. The detective who hears himself or another detective
repeat the victim-blaming tropes within and among interrogations would
therefore be more likely over time to find such familiar statements to be
plausible or true. At a time when some police departments are finally
attempting to train detectives to be less skeptical of women complaining of
sexual assault,307 interrogation training and experience sends the opposite
message.
Although there is no empirical research proving that the lessons of
moral minimization seep into the police behavior and culture, we should be
concerned about the risks for three reasons. First, police officers who accept
even a diluted version of the belief that victims are to blame for their
victimhood, will be less effective in investigating and solving such crimes.
Detectives who blame women for rape or assault bring excessive skepticism
to their reports. Second, such officers will reinforce a culture of misogyny
and male superiority in a profession that is already fraught with allegations
of sexual harassment and discrimination. Third, officers who are not only
exposed to, but are trained to deliver, a barrage of sexist rationalizations for
misconduct on a regular basis will be more prone to repeat these behaviors
in their private as well as their public lives.
In the end, our point is simple. American police are too prone to
blame women victims of violent crimes. We are not likely to make progress
on that cultural problem while we are, at the same time, encouraging police
detectives to blame women for violent crimes in interrogation rooms.

306
Lisa K. Fazio, et al., Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth, 144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.
GEN. 993, 993 (2015).
307
See Shaun Griswold, Police Respond to Bias, Victim-blaming Concerns in MMIWR Cases, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 28, 2021), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/police-respond-to-bias-victim-blamingconcerns-in-mmiwr-cases. See also DOJ Issues New Guidance for Police in Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault
Cases, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/doj-issues-new-guidance-police-domesticviolence-and-sexual-assault-cases.
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IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The interrogation tactic of moral minimization – especially victimblaming – poses risks. Section II explains how minimization weakens the
internal and informal incentives to obey the law. Section III explains how
misogynistic victim-blaming reinforces a police culture of hypermasculinity that impedes the investigation of crimes against women. Our
aim in this article is merely to begin a conversation on what the appropriate
response is. We outline two options: counter-messaging and curbing the use
of the tactic.
A. Counter-Messaging: Neutralizing the Neutralizations
If nothing is done to limit the tactic of moral minimization, perhaps
we could improve the counter-messaging. In Part II-C, we rejected the
argument that various parts of the criminal justice system currently provide
an effective counter-message undoing the harm of moral minimization.308
Among a series of reasons for pessimism, one observation was that if no
one in the criminal system has noticed the danger of moral minimization,
then we cannot expect anyone to have even attempted to formulate the best
counter-message. We are now in a position to ask, can we do better? If the
costs we identify are no longer unexpected, can we retain the tactic but
avoid its harm?
Ultimately, we think the answer is no, but there is room for
improvement. Our focus is on the judge. There is a sentencing hearing after
every conviction in which a judge may justify the announced sentence to
the convicted defendant. Some judges already use this occasion to articulate
to the moral wrong of the offense and the basis for the defendant’s
responsibility. Where this message is delivered (perhaps supported by
victim impact testimony), the system is doing all it can (absent a jury
verdict) to create a counter-message to the detective’s moral minimization.
Indeed, this may be an important and neglected justification for a judge
explaining the moral basis of a sentencing decision to a convicted offender:
308

See text accompanying notes 172-180.
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to undermine the offender’s neutralizations for the crime, which may have
been reinforced in interrogation via moral minimization. Not all judges take
seriously this aspect of sentencing, but our analysis suggests that they
should.
Yet, where the judges take this part of their role seriously, they labor
under disadvantages discussed in Part II-C, one of which is that the judge
usually has no idea what the detectives said to the offender during
interrogation. Unlike the other disadvantages, this one is correctible. As
long as we continue to permit moral minimization, we offer one concrete
reform to improve the expressive position of the judge.
Our proposal is for pre-sentencing reports to henceforth include a
section summarizing any moral minimization tactics the detectives
employed during an interrogation of the offender, whether or not it led to
incriminating statements. This would permit judges to tailor their remarks at
sentencing to address and reject the specific minimizations the detectives
employed. If the detectives in an embezzlement case blamed the employer
for paying too small a salary, the judge should be informed of this tactic and
then explain to the offender at sentencing why that particular rationalization
is morally unpersuasive.309
B. Limiting the Use of Moral Minimization
Counter-messaging is ultimately insufficient. First, it is not a
solution for the adverse effect of victim-blaming on interrogators and
policing culture. Second, it is not going to work for those exposed to moral
minimizations who are never criminally charged or convicted. Third, we
doubt it could ever completely undo the criminogenic damage for reasons
stated in Part II-C. But even if we are wrong in the abstract, because some
ideal counter-message could work perfectly, in the real world of conviction
by guilty plea, busy judges who will not tailor messages to refute particular
moral minimizations, and the inevitable absence of victims from some
cases, the best counter-messaging plans will often fail.
309
We do not propose that judges use this information to arrive at a sentence. In our view, the fact that a
defendant succumbed to confession because of a moral minimization tactic is neither a sentencing aggravator nor a
mitigator. Rather, the possibility that judges may have insight into pinpointing the rationale for a defendant’s
behavior could actually help reduce the risk of recurrence if that insight is applied well.
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As previously indicated, there is no serious empirical evidence
supporting the effectiveness of the Reid interrogation methods, much less
the particular tactic of moral minimization.310 Even without absolute clarity
about the precise costs and benefits of minimization, a new
acknowledgement that there are these costs demands recognition of the
tradeoffs in using the strategy. As no one has previously identified the costs
described here, they have been ignored. If detectives sense a possible
benefit, but fail to recognize the risks, they inevitably use the tactic beyond
the socially optimum level. Some limitation is therefore justified. We
briefly discuss three options. In all cases, the reforms would be
implemented either by state or local legislation or by police department
policy changes.311
A minimal categorical approach is to single out the worst
minimizations for prohibition. The logical starting point might be to
prohibit victim-blaming, or even more narrowly, to prohibit blaming
victims by endorsing sexist stereotypes, or parallel stereotypes founded on
race, sexual orientation, etc. While any generalizable minimization risks
encouraging crime, these minimizations are distinctively problematic for the
reasons we explored in Part III. One might analogize such a ban to the
prohibition against race-based peremptory challenges in jury selection.312
All other minimizations would be permitted.
A broader categorical approach would prohibit all moral
minimizations except where the tactic would be expected to do the least
harm. As we have discussed above, there are some types of crimes for
which moral minimization is least likely to be criminogenic.313 Murder is an
example where the crime will be punished by such a long prison term that
the concern for recidivism is attenuated.314 There are also particular kinds of

310

See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text..
See Brandon Garrett, Interrogation Policies, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (2015).
312
Batson v. Kentucky, 476, U.S. 79, 84-86 (1986) (“Purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the
venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure.”). By the analogy, we do not address here the question whether a criminal suspect has a
constitutional right against the employment of racist or sexist interrogation methods.
313
See supra Part II-B.
314
See supra text accompanying notes 232-233.
311
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minimizations that are not generalizable, and therefore not likely to
diminish internal and informal incentives to comply with law. We
illustrated again with murder examples, as in a case where detectives
blamed the murder victim for having previously killed a relative of the
suspect, a reason to offend that is usually not likely to repeat itself.315
Considering these two factors on a case-by-case basis would be enormously
complicated, but one could combine these points to justify a workable
regulation that authorized moral minimization tactics in murder
interrogations, but not the interrogation of other crimes.
The most ambitious approach is to abandon wholesale the
accusatory method of interrogation. The Reid method is one of several
accusatory or confrontational interrogation methods, in which the
interrogator persistently asserts confidence in the suspect’s guilt. Broadly
speaking, the alternative to the accusatory method is the informationgathering method. In 1992, police in the United Kingdom moved from a
confrontational interrogation method to an information-gathering method
named PEACE, an acronym for its five phases – planning/preparation,
engage/explain, account (clarification and challenge), closure, and
evaluation.316 The method involves communication strategies that
encourage building rapport and encouraging suspects to develop a
painstaking detailed account of events. The suspect is induced to talk a great
deal and on the theory that guilty suspects tend to start contradicting
themselves.317
England and Wales adopted PEACE as a more ethical and
professional approach to investigative questioning in response to several
scandals involving false confessions.318 At least one American jurisdiction
that has adopted PEACE framework for interrogations – Vermont – and
315

See supra text accompanying notes 230-231.
Colin Clarke & Rebecca Milne, National Evaluation of the PEACE Investigative Interviewing Course 2-3
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thus we have reason to believe it can be compatible with a U.S. policing and
the constitutional rights that attend the interrogation process.319
A major research question is which method of interrogation is more
successful at securing true confessions while avoiding false confessions.
The existing social science research is unable to provide a definitive answer,
although the existing results favor the information-gathering method.320 The
PEACE model is highly regarded among law enforcement in England in
Wales and has been sought after in Australian, European and North
American jurisdictions.321 At least one other study concluded that PEACE
strategies, when properly used, produced better outcomes with outcomes
defined as either obtaining a fuller version of the occurrence or a
confession.322 Finally in controlled meta-studies on the cognitive form of
interviewing used in the PEACE framework, the reliability of the
information obtained in the under the PEACE like model was significantly
better.323
These empirical issues are ultimately beyond the scope of this
article. Without resolving the debate, this article contributes to it by
identifying two new costs of the moral minimization tactics that are
exclusively a part of the accusatory method. Our concerns over the
criminogenic and sexist effects of moral minimization add two reasons to
the existing literature for why a switch to an information-gathering method
is desirable.
Which brings us to note the obvious point that if American police
interrogators abandoned the accusatory method and switched to
information-gathering, the problems we identify in this article would
disappear. Prohibiting an interrogation tactic is inherently complicated by
issues of remedy, but the simplest way to stop the use of moral
319
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minimization is to shift entirely away from the accusatory method. What
this would require is less a prohibition of certain methods (although that
might be useful during the transition) than the basic training of detectives in
a new approach. If American police detectives learned from a manual that
did not advocate the reinforcement of neutralizations via moral
minimization, then they would eventually stop using minimizations, at least
not as a central and well-elaborated theme of the interrogation.
V. CONCLUSION
Moral minimization is pervasive in American police interrogations,
and yet it is a relic of the past, a dangerous anachronism. The misogynistic
victim-blaming narratives that the manuals offer to illustrate minimization
tactics are every bit as old as they sound, dating back at least to 1962. As
jarring as those examples are, however, the tactic’s connection to the past is
deeper. We expect twenty-first century policing to be based on data, as
much as possible, and yet these tactics were created based on early or midtwentieth century anecdote. The argument for moral minimization is that “it
works,” but there is still no real social science evidence supporting that
claim, and it appears that the newer alternatives in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere also “work,” possibly better, without minimization.
In 1962, it could not have occurred to anyone that interrogations
with a theme of moral minimization were more or less the precise opposite
procedure as a restorative justice conference, because such conferences did
not (publicly) exist, much less were there randomized controlled trials
demonstrating that the brief conferences could reduce recidivism by
confronting and critiquing the offender’s neutralizations for the crime. In
the mid-twentieth century, there was little in the way of social scientific
empiricism that people obeyed the law in part because they were
reciprocating the perceived compliance of others and also because they
perceived the law to be substantively legitimate. As such, it would not then
have been apparent that the energetic efforts of law enforcement officers to
persuade suspects that “anyone” would have committed the crime in their
place would damage the reciprocity motive for legal compliance, nor that
convincing suspects that the crime is not serious and the blame lies
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elsewhere would damage the law’s legitimacy and that motive for
compliance. Yet all of these problems and more are apparent now.
This article proposes balance where none exists. Police officials
gather to discuss crime control, such as how to best deploy patrol officers or
how to maintain their procedural legitimacy. In other meetings, detectives
gather to train for interrogation techniques. These distinct groups never
consider that the training is undermining the crime control. Yet the
explanation for the minimization tactic – that reinforcing the offender’s
neutralizations for the crime will disinhibit the offender’s confession –
necessarily implies that the tactic will also make future offending more
likely. And the practice of victim-blaming tactics will make it less likely
that detectives believe women and properly investigate violent crimes in
which they are the victim. These policing groups might hope that the effects
we describe are small in magnitude or short-lived. We agree that more study
is needed, but hoping is not enough. As long as the interrogation value of
moral minimization is uncertain, we should not continue to ignore the
unintended risks of the tactic when other interrogation methods exist.
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